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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services, ex rel.
LARAMIE County, WYOMING
ex rel. TERRY McNINCH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

1

Case No. 950268 CA

TERRY L. WESTMORELAND,

I

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3 (2) (i) (1995) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the State of Utah had standing to bring the

paternity/support action pursuant to the Utah Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act against Appellant Westmoreland.
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which
this Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the
trial court's determination.

Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768

P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); West Valley City Fraternal Order of
Police v. Nordfelt. 869 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1993).

1

2.

Whether the State of Utah's paternity/support action,

brought pursuant to the Utah Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, is barred by the Wyoming Statute of Limitations.
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which
this Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the
trial court's determination.

Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868

(Utah 1990).
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Appellee State of Utah generally agrees with Appellant
Westmoreland's Statement of the Case; however, he fails to
mention several relevant and important events. A trial was held
before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, District Judge, on June 8,
1994 (R. 327) .

At the end of the trial, the parties were

directed by the Court regarding the dates for submission of
motions, memos, and responses (R. 462). The parties submitted
their respective
direction

pleadings

in accordance with the Court's

(R. 254-278; R. 279-300; R. 301-308).

The Court,

after review of the motions, memos, and responses filed by the
parties entered a memorandum decision in favor of the State of
Utah

on

all

issues

on

September

Addendum)(R. 311-315).

2

9,

1994

(attached

in

Thereafter, the Court requested that the State of Utah
draft

findings

of

fact

and

a

decree

for

approval

by

Westmoreland's counsel (R. 479). The proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were submitted to Westmoreland's counsel
and on February 21, 1995, he filed an Objection to the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Paternity, Judgment
and Order of Support (R. 482-487).

On February 24, 1995, the

State of Utah filed a Response to Westmoreland's Objection (R.
510-514).
On February 27, 1995, Judge Hadfield entered detailed and
specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
502)(Appellant's

Addendum).

Judge

Hadfield

(R. 488-

entered

these

findings after review of Westmoreland's Objections (Minute Entry
dated May 19, 1995, not numbered in record).
Based upon his findings, Judge Hadfield concluded that
Westmoreland is the natural father of Cody Ray Holland, born on
April 1, 1977; that a judgment for child support arrears should
be entered in the amount of $11,088.00 for the time period of
December 1988 through January 1995; and that Westmoreland should
pay monthly child support for Cody Holland of $209.00 beginning

3

F e b r u a r y 1995. x

Additionally,

and Conclusions

of

Law,

as p a r t of t h e F i n d i n g s of Fact

judgments were a l s o

entered

against

Westmoreland i n favor of t h e n a t u r a l mother, T e r r y McNinch,
t h e amount of $506.00 f o r reimbursement of c o s t s f o r
in t h i s action,

in

appearing

and a g a i n s t Westmoreland and i n favor of

the

S t a t e of Utah i n t h e amount of $285.00 f o r t h e c o s t of g e n e t i c
blood t e s t i n g
The
Support

(R. 5 0 1 - 5 0 2 ) .

final

Decree

of

Paternity,

(URESA) was e n t e r e d

February

Judgment

and

Order

27,

(R.

504-506) .

1995

of

Westmoreland f i l e d h i s N o t i c e of Appeal on March 28, 1995
522).

Westmoreland's

court's

findings

support

amount,

appeal

does

and c o n c l u s i o n s
the arrearage

not

the

trial

r e g a r d i n g t h e ongoing

child

amounts,

challenge

(R.

or the

judgments

for

appearance and blood t e s t i n g c o s t s . 2
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Wyo. S t a t . § 20-4-101 t o - 1 3 7 (1994) Revised Uniform R e c i p r o c a l
Enforcement of Support Act ( a t t a c h e d i n Addendum).

Based upon t h e f a c t s found, Judge H a d f i e l d concluded t h a t t h e a r r e a r s
should be c a l c u l a t e d a t t h e r a t e of $175.00 p e r month for t h e months of
December 1989 through June 1994 and a t t h e r a t e of $209.00 p e r month for t h e
p e r i o d of J u l y 1994 through J a n u a r y 1995 (R. 5 0 1 ) .
2
The Notice of Appeal filed by Westmoreland states it is an appeal of
the entire February 27, 1995 judgment, however, the only issues briefed by
Westmoreland on appeal are standing and the statute of limitations (R. 522;
Appellant's Br. at 3-6).

4

Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-1 to-39 (1995) Uniform
Enforcement of Support Act (attached in Addendum).

Reciprocal

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l to-17 (1992 & Supp. 1995) Uniform Act
on Paternity (attached in Addendum).
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-101 to-319 (1994
Parentage Act (Appellant's Addendum).

&

Supp.

1995)

Uniform

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1987) provides:
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action
has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) provides:
Within eight years an action:
(1)
upon a judgment or decree of any court of
the United States, or of any state or territory within
the United States.
(2)
to enforce any liability due or to become
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance for
dependent children.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36

(1987) provides:

If a person entitled to bring an action, other than
for the recovery of real property, is at the time the
cause of action accrued, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal
guardian, the time of the disability is not part of
the time limited for the commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-45

(1995) provides:

When a cause of action has arisen in another state or
territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws
thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained
against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an
action thereon shall not be maintained against him in
this state, except in favor of one who has been a

5

citizen of this state and who has held the cause of
action from the time it accrued.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 provides:
Any person, notwithstanding
Section 16-10a-1051,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an
individual, his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
claim arising from:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)

the transaction of any business within this
state;
contracting to supply services or goods in
this state;
the causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;
the ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this state;
contracting to insure any person, property,
or risk located within this state at the
time of contracting;
with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance,
or
child
support,
having
resided, in the marital relationship, within
this
state
notwithstanding
subsequent
departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the
claim, so long as that act is not a mere
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over
which the defendant had no control; or
the commission of sexual intercourse within
this state which gives rise to a paternity
suit under Title
78, Chapter 45a, to
determine paternity for the purpose of
establishing
responsibility
for
child
support.

6

U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1 provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.
STATEMENT QF FACTS
The State of Utah generally agrees with the Statement of
Facts as set forth in Westmoreland's brief; however, the State
of* Utah wishes to supplement those facts.
McNinch testified that she lived in Salt Lake City when she
lived on and off with Westmoreland between 1975 and February
1977 (R. 338) .

Furthermore, McNinch testified that, prior to

the child's birth, Westmoreland suspected McNinch was pregnant,
and he told her "if you are, I'll leave and deny it's mine" (R.
3 62) .

Thereafter,

when

Westmoreland

learned

McNinch

was

pregnant, he denied the child was his, "got mad," and "tried to
run [McNinch] over" (R. 3 62).
Additionally, it was McNinch's testimony that when she was
finally able to contact Westmoreland after the child's birth,
Westmoreland told her that he did not want anything to do with
the child and had returned to his wife (R. 343-344; R. 346).
McNinch testified that from that point on she made numerous

7

attempts

to

locate

Westmoreland,

seeking

assistance

from

Westmoreland's sister (R.390-391; R. 393-394; R. 397). At this
point, McNinch believed Westmoreland was "hiding out" (R. 347349) .
After the birth of the child, McNinch began dating Ernie
Holland

(R. 342; R. 3 91-392) .

McNinch did not have sexual

intercourse with Holland until May 1977, more than a month after
the child's birth (R. 343; R. 439) . McNinch married Holland on
May 13, 1977 (R. 342; R. 385).

Holland treated the child like

he would his own son, and wanted Cody to have his last name (R.
344; R. 388; R. 441) .
McNinch and Holland

signed

statements

filed with Vital

Statistics in the State of Wyoming acknowledging his paternity
of

the

child,

and

an amended

birth

certificate

that

Holland's name as Cody's father (R. 343; R. 386-387).

added

McNinch

and Holland had been erroneously informed that, since there was
not a father listed on the original birth certificate, the
stepfather could possibly adopt the child or at least change the
child's surname by signing the amended birth certificate
344; R. 390; R. 437).

(R.

McNinch and Holland later learned that

signing the certificate did not result in a legal adoption (R.
344).

The child was never adopted (R. 344; R. 437).
8

McNinch and Holland were divorced on February 6, 1981. The
Divorce Decree stated, "The Court finds that no children, now
under the age of 18 years, were born to the marriage and none
are expected."

Based upon the language in the Divorce Decree,

Judge Hadfield specifically found that there was no presumption
that Holland is the presumed father of Cody Holland (R. 312).
After the divorce from McNinch, Holland neither contacted the
child nor provided any type of support (R. 3 88).
McNinch testified that in 1981, Westmoreland came to a
truck stop where McNinch was working and indicated to her that
he was separated from his wife.
McNinch that night.

Westmoreland went home with

The next morning Westmoreland "told Cody

that he was his dad, Terry" (R. 350-352).
testified

that Westmoreland

refused

Furthermore, McNinch

to provide

either his

address or phone number, and when the mother requested the
information, Westmoreland simply stated that he lived in Cedar
City, Utah (R. 353).
Westmoreland again met the child in 1992, while McNinch and
the child were visiting Westmoreland's sister in Brigham City,
Utah (R. 357-358).

During this visit, McNinch took several

pictures of the father and child posing together (R. 358; R.
449) .

Before leaving, Westmoreland provided McNinch with his
9

work phone number at Miller Brothers in Hiram, Utah, and told
the child that he could call him there

(R. 360) .

McNinch

requested support from Westmoreland, but Westmoreland indicated
that he could not pay

(R. 3 62) .

Later, when McNinch and the

child attempted to contact the father at Miller Brothers, "they
told us Terry was there; then they'd come back on the phone and
say that he wasn't there"

(R. 360-361).

McNinch never told

Westmoreland, or anyone else, that Westmoreland was not the
natural father of the child, or that she did not wish to receive
support from him (R. 3 62).
The State of Wyoming provided public assistance to McNinch
and the child from December 1989 through March 1990 and from
March 1993 through June 1994 (R. 371-372).

On May 15, 1992, the

State of Wyoming, County of Laramie, as the initiating state,
initiated proceedings pursuant to the revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-101 to-137 (1994)
and requested that the State of Utah, as the responding state,
file the current action (R. 8-34).
On March 12, 1993, the State of Utah filed a complaint in
this paternity action pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l to-17 (1992 & Supp. 1995), alleging

10

that Terry L. Westmoreland was the natural father of Cody R.
Holland, born April 1, 1977 to Terry McNinch (R. 1-7).
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
This Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA)
action was properly initiated by the State of Utah upon relation
with the State of Wyoming and Terry McNinch.

Pursuant to the

URESA provisions, the State of Utah has standing to establish
paternity and an order of support against Westmoreland.

Under

URESA, it was neither necessary nor proper to join the child as
a party.

Furthermore, under the URESA provisions, the law of

the responding state, Utah, controls on all issues.

This makes

the Wyoming statute of limitations inapplicable.

Thus, the

action is not barred by the Wyoming Statute.
Additionally, even if Wyoming, and not Utah, law controlled
regarding the issue of fatherhood presumption, the trial court
correctly concluded that the presumption of fatherhood had been
rebutted by the divorce decree between McNinch and her exhusband, Ernie Holland.

Therefore, the trial court correctly

and properly entered its Decree of Paternity and Order of
Support.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT STANDING OF THE
STATE OF UTAH WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS ACTION.
A.

Under the express provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, as adopted by both the
State of Utah and the State of Wyoming, the State of
Utah, as the responding state, has standing to pursue
this £CtiQnT

Westmoreland has mistakenly asserted that the initiating
state, in this case, Wyoming, must first establish that there is
a duty of support before a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA) action can be pursued.

URESA provides two

different procedures for the civil enforcement of child support
obligations in an interstate context.

U

A support duty can be

civilly enforced under URESA through two procedures:

the filing

of a regular URESA petition and the registration of a "foreign"
support order."

M. Haynes, Interstate Child Support Remedies.

Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, at 66 (Sept. 1989) (attached in Addendum) .
The State of Utah has adopted the URESA.

Utah Code Ann. §

77-31-1 to-39 (1995) . Sections 77-31-11 through-31 provide the
procedure for enforcement by petition, while sections § 77-31-32
through-37

provide

registration.

Id.

the
This

procedure
case

12

for

involves

a

enforcement
"regular"

on
URESA

petition, one which requests enforcement by petition, not a
registration of a "foreign" order.

The URESA Action Request

Forms submitted to Utah by the State of Wyoming request that
Utah establish a paternity order and establish an order of child
support for unreimbursed public assistance (R. 15-16).
This specific request by the initiating state, Wyoming,
along with Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-24 (1995), provide the State
of Utah with the authority as the responding state to determine
a duty of support.

In this regard, Utah's URESA provides:

If the court of the responding state finds a duty of
support, it may order the respondent to furnish
support or reimbursement therefor and subject property
of the respondent to such order. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-24 (1995).
Importantly, the applicable law for determining this duty
of support is the State of Utah's:
Duties of support applicable under this act are those
imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where
the obligor was present during this period for which
support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have
been present in the responding state during the period
for which support is sought until otherwise shown.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-7

(1995) .

Furthermore, there is no

evidence in this case that Westmoreland has been a resident of

13

any state other than Utah

(R. 338; R. 353; R. 360) .3 This

highlights the appropriateness of the State of Utah filing this
complaint pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity.

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-45a-l, to-17 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (R. 1-7) .
Additionally, if a state or political sub-division has
provided public assistance on behalf of an obligor's dependents,
as the State of Wyoming has in this case, this state has the
same right as the individual obligee

to initiate a URESA

proceeding for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement of the
support furnished.

Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-108 (1994).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-8 (1995) .

See also

Thus, the public assistance

provided by Wyoming in this case further fortifies its right to
initiate the URESA request and the standing of the State of Utah
in this case.
Section 77-31-8 also sets out the remedies available to any
state that has provided support for the child.

This section

provides:
Whenever the s t a t e or p o l i t i c a l subdivision thereof
furnishes support t o an o b l i g e e , . . . the s t a t e or
p o l i t i c a l subdivision has the same r i g h t t o invoke the
p r o v i s i o n s hereof as the obligee for the purposes of
See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-4 (1995) which provides t h a t "Duties of
upport arising under the law of t h i s State [Utah] when applicable under
ection 77-31-7 bind the obligor, present in t h i s S t a t e , regardless of the
presence or residence of the obligee."
14

securing reimbursement of support expenditures,
collecting child support, and establishing paternity.
Utah Code Ann, § 77-31-8 (1995)(emphasis added). See also Utah
Code Ann. § 77-31-9 (1995) which authorizes the establishment of
paternity actions under the Utah URESA.

Therefore, the Utah

statute explicitly grants the authority to seek a paternity
determination in a URESA action.
It should also be noted the trial court specifically found
that McNinch was a resident of the State of Utah at the time of
conception and the conception occurred in the State of Utah (R.
312). Under Utah law,4 McNinch would have the right the pursue
this action even if she chose to bypass URESA.

In this regard,

Westmoreland submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Utah
courts in a paternity suit for the purpose of establishing
responsibility for child support when he engaged in sexual
intercourse within the state.

See Baldwin v. Easterling, 754

P.2d 942 (Utah 1988) .

Utah law states that a person submits himself to the jurisdiction of
Utah Courts if he engages in, "the commission of sexual intercourse within
this State which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a,
to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for
child support." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(7) (Supp. 1995).
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B.

The trial court correctly held that there was no
presumption that Ernie IfoUanfl is £Jl£ biological
father of Cody Holland.

As discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that
Utah, not Wyoming law, applies in this case (R. 312). The blood
test results in this case showed a probability of 99.99% with an
index of 59047 to 1 that Westmoreland is the natural father of
Cody Holland (Exhibits 1-2)(attached in Addendum).

Under Utah

la,w, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10(3) (a) (1992), "A man is presumed
to be the natural father of a child if genetic testing results
with a paternity index of at least 100."

Under Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-45a-10(3)(b) (1992), this presumption "may be rebutted in
an appropriate action by clear and convincing evidence."
presumption has not been rebutted in this case.
under

Utah

law,

the

presumption

is

that

This

Therefore,

Westmoreland,

not

Holland, is the natural father of Cody Holland.
However, assuming that Wyoming law applies as Westmoreland
does when he next argues that under Wyoming law, the State of
Utah lacks standing because Ernie Holland and Terry McNinch,
following their marriage, signed and filed acknowledgments of
his paternity of Cody.
It is undisputed that Ernie Holland married Terry McNinch,
and acknowledgments of paternity were signed and filed with the
16

Vital Records Services

(Exhibits 9-10) .

The State of Utah

acknowledges that pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a) (Supp.
1995),

Holland

may

have

thereafter

been

considered

the

"presumed" father of Cody Holland, even though he could not be
the natural

father.5

However, such a presumption

is not

conclusive and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
See LCv. TL. 870 P.2d 374 (Wyo. 1994).

Westmoreland argues t h a t t h i s presumption of fatherhood for
Holland has never been rebutted under Wyoming law.

His two

bases for t h i s argument are set f o r t h in h i s brief at pages 1213.

F i r s t , Wyo. S t a t . 14-2-102(b)

(1995), s t a t e s :

A presumption under t h i s section may be rebutted in an
appropriate action only by c l e a r and convincing
evidence.
If two (2) or more presumptions a r i s e in
c o n f l i c t with each other, the presumption which on the
f a c t s i s founded on the weightier considerations of
policy and logic c o n t r o l s . A presumption i s rebutted
by a court decree e s t a b l i s h i n g p a t e r n i t y of the c h i l d
by another man.
Second, Westmoreland r e l i e s on the t r i a l testimony of Holland
stating

that

he had not

initiated

an action

to

rebut

the

Both Holland and McNinch t e s t i f i e d that no sexual r e l a t i o n s took p l a c e
between them p r i o r t o the b i r t h of Cody Holland and there e x i s t e d no
p o s s i b i l i t y that Holland could be the natural father of the c h i l d (R. 343; R.
439) .
Holland a l s o t e s t i f i e d that he and the mother signed the acknowledgment
because they were t o l d that t h i s was a way t o change the b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e so
the e n t i r e family could have the same surname (R. 437).
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presumption that he was the natural father of Cody Holland (R.
442) .
Westmoreland's

arguments

are without

merit.

Holland's

testimony is irrelevant on whether the presumption has been
rebutted.

The language of the Wyoming statute is that the

presumption may be rebutted in an appropriate action.
Stat.

14-2-102(b)

(1995).

The

fact

is

that

the

Wyo.

issue

of

Holland's presumed fatherhood of Cody Holland was adjudicated in
an appropriate action. In this regard, on February 6, 1981, a
Decree of Divorce was entered in the 254th Judicial District
Court in Dallas County, Texas between Holland and McNinch.
Court in that action stated:
[H]aving examined the pleadings and heard the evidence
and argument of counsel, finds that all necessary
residence qualifications and prerequisites of law have
been
legally
satisfied,
that
this
Court
has
jurisdiction of all the parties and subject matter of
this cause, and that the material
allegations
contained in Petitioner's pleadings are true. A jury
was waived, and all matters in controversy, including
questions of fact and of law, were submitted to the
Court. All persons entitled to citation were properly
cited.
Based thereon, the Court ruled as follows:
The Court finds that no children, now under the age of
eighteen years, were born to the marriage and none are
expected.
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The

(Exhibit

6) (attached

in Addendum) .

Westmoreland

has not

challenged the validity of this order, thus, Utah and Wyoming
are required to give this Texas judgment Full Faith and Credit
under Article IV of the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that subsequent
challenges to such a decree are foreclosed by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.

See Livingston v. Vanderiet. 861 P. 2d 549 (Wyo.

In Livingston, the court stated: uWe have held that a

1993).

decree of divorce granted by one state having jurisdiction to do
so is entitled to Full Faith and Credit under the Constitutional
provision, in every other state."

Id. at 551 (citing Matter of

Fray, 721 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1986)).
The

public

policy

behind

recognition

of

judicial

proceedings by another state has been summarized as follows:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United
States finally determines the conditions under which
the decrees of Courts in one state are to be
recognized in other states. In these days of a mobile
population, it is highly desirable, if not essential,
for a divorce decree to be unchallengeable in all
states.
Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States.
Section 11.2, at 287 (1968) (as quoted in Fray, 721 P.2d at
1058).

In Livingston, the Court held that absent a showing that
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a divorce decree from another state was invalid or voidable, it
would be given Full Faith and Credit in the URESA proceeding in
Wyoming.

Livingston, 861 P.2d at 551.

Giving Full Faith and Credit to the Texas divorce decree,
under Wyoming law, the Texas court's finding that no children
were born to the marriage included Cody Holland and rebutted any
presumption that Holland was the natural father of Cody Holland.6
Had there been an issue of paternity and support, the decree of
divorce between McNinch and Holland would have addressed the
issue.

Had either party wished

to continue the parental

relationship, some provision would have been made at the time.
Instead, the presumption of paternity was rebutted, and Holland
severed his relationship with Cody Holland and never continued
to give

his

support

thereafter

(R. 368) .

Thus,

Holland

satisfied the requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(b) (1995).
Additionally, it should be noted that, notwithstanding
Westmoreland's arguments regarding the presumption, the Decree
of

Paternity

entered

in

this

action

is

a

court

decree

establishing paternity of the child by someone other than

The issue of paternity can be adjudicated in a divorce proceeding. See
Masters v. Worsely. 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); also, a divorce decree
is a final judgment and res judicata on all issues decided. See Warren v.
Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo. 1987).
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Holland (R. 504-407)(Appellant's Addendum).

Therefore, under

the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(b) (1995), Holland's
presumption of fatherhood of the child in this action has been
properly rebutted.

c.

it was not necessary to m^ke the gfrjlfl a party to this
URESA actiont

Westmoreland

cites

Wyo.

Stat.

§

14-2-107

(1995)

as

authority for his contention that the State of Utah lacks
standing because the child was not made a part of this action.
It is important to note that this action is not being brought
pursuant to the Wyoming Parentage Act at Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-101
to -319 (1993 & Supp. 1995) .

It was brought pursuant to the

URESA laws of Wyoming and Utah.

In URESA proceedings, because

the issue is duty to support, courts have held that the person
having physical custody of the minor child has standing to
initiate a URESA action without the appointment as guardian ad
litem.

See Saask v. Yandell, 702 P.2d 1327 (Alaska 1985);

Suddeth v. Scott, 394 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1984); and McMullen v.
Muir, 517 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio App. 1986).
As outlined above, this action was properly initiated by
the State of Wyoming and responded to by the State of Utah under

21

URESA.

The Utah URESA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-13

provides:
A petition on behalf of a minor obligee may be brought
by a person having legal custody of the minor without
appointment as guardian ad litem.
And the Wyoming URESA pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 20-4-113 (1994)
states:
A complaint on behalf of a minor obligee may be
executed and filed by a person having legal custody of
the minor without appointment as guardian ad litem.
Thus, it was not necessary to join the child as a party as
asserted by Westmoreland.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS URESA ACTION
BROUGHT BY THE STATE OF UTAH TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY AND AN
ORDER OF SUPPORT WAS NOT BARRED BY THE WYOMING STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
A.

Utah l^w applies, &Q the Wyoming Statute Ot
limitations is inapplicable and under Utah law, there
is no time limit as to when a paternity action may be
brought t

Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
adopted by both the State of Utah and the State of Wyoming, the
laws of the responding state apply.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-

4 to-7 (1995); Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-107 (1994).
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Thus, in the

i n s t a n t action, the Wyoming s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s would not be
applicable because Utah law would apply. 7
In Nielsen v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977), the State
and a c h i l d ' s mother brought an action to e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i t y
and a child support o b l i g a t i o n .

The t r i a l court had dismissed

the complaint based upon the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) .

The Utah Supreme Court reversed

the t r i a l court and s t a t e d t h a t there was no time l i m i t as to
when a s u i t may be i n i t i a t e d to determine p a t e r n i t y .
564 P. 2d at 1114.

Nielsen

Nielsen has not been overruled and remains

the law.
The issue of the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s in c h i l d support
ccplLections was r a i s e d also in Szarak v. Sandoval. 636 P. 2d 1082
(Utah 1981).

In t h a t decision, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed

the Uniform Act on P a t e r n i t y

and observed

that

a

petition

seeking p a t e r n i t y establishment may be f i l e d by the mother, the
child,

or

the

public

authority

(the

Department

of

Human

Furthermore, because McNinch was a r e s i d e n t of t h e S t a t e of Utah a t t h e
time of conception of t h e c h i l d , even i f t h e Wyoming s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s
b a r r e d t h e a c t i o n t h e r e , i t s t i l l could be maintained i n Utah. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-45 (1995), which p r o v i d e s : "When a cause of a c t i o n has a r i s e n i n
a n o t h e r s t a t e or t e r r i t o r y , or i n a f o r e i g n c o u n t r y , and by t h e laws t h e r e o f
an a c t i o n t h e r e o n cannot t h e r e be m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t a p e r s o n by r e a s o n of t h e
l a p s e of time, an a c t i o n t h e r e o n s h a l l not be maintained a g a i n s t him i n t h i s
s t a t e , except i n favor of one who has been a c i t i z e n of t h i s s t a t e and who has
h e l d t h e cause of a c t i o n from t h e time i t a c c r u e d . "
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Services) and that once paternity is established, the liability
for

child

support

may be

enforced

in the

same

or other

proceeding by the mother, the child, or the public authority.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l, 78-45a-2 (1992 & Supp. 1995) .
The Utah Supreme Court held in Szarak that the other two
statutes of limitations under § 78-12-1 were not applicable in
establishing paternity.

The Szarak Court found that Utah Code

Anp. § 78-12-36 (1987) , the tolling statute regarding causes of
actions of a minor, precluded the application of any period of
limitation against the child, the child's mother, and the public
authority.
The Court in Szarak went on to hold that the statute of
limitation is tolled during the child's minority for a paternity
and child support action undertaken by the child's mother and/or
the State, based upon the public policies protected by the
tolling provisions of section 78-12-36.

Szarak. 636 P. 2d at

1085.
Thus, in the instant case, under applicable Utah law, there
is no statute of limitations for bringing this action.
B.

Even if the Wyoming statutes were applicable, this
action was brought within that limitation.
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Interestingly, the applicable statute of limitation in the
State of Wyoming, even if it did apply, would not act as a bar
to the establishment of paternity in this case.

Wyoming law

provides as follows:
An action to determine the existence of the father and
child relationship as to a child who has no presumed
father under W.S. [Wyo. Stat.] 14-2-102 may be
brought: (i) not later than three (3) years after the
child reaches the age of majority if the action is
brought by or on behalf of the child or by the
department of family services; or (ii) not later than
five (5) years after the birth of the child in all
other cases.
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-105(a) (1994).
One of the foundational premises underlying the Uniform
Parentage Act is that a father of a minor child receiving public
assistance ought to reimburse the public for the support of his

child. £££ Ellison vf welter ex rel, Walter/ 834 p.2d 680 (Wyo.
1992).

To further this policy, the Uniform Parentage Act grants

standing to a state to initiate a paternity action on behalf of
a child receiving public assistance within three (3) years after
the child reaches the age of majority.

See Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-

105(a) (1994) .
This action was initiated by the Department of Family
Services in the State of Wyoming, Laramie County, before the
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child reached the age of majority; therefore, the action is
within the statute of limitations under Wyoming law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the
lower court's Decree, Order and Judgment.

In this regard, there

is ample authority to support the trial court's conclusion that
the State of Utah has standing to bring this URESA action and
the claim is not barred by the Wyoming statute of limitations.
Respectfully submitted this

^

day of September, 1995.

Billy L. Walker
Steven A. Combe
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Appellee
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Art. Ill, § 3

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
[3.] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed
phrases in the first paragraph of this section
were superseded by Amendment XL

Sec. 3. [Treason, proof and punishment]
[1.] Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or m adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person attainted.

ARTICLE IV
[STATE AND
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS]
Section
1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial
proceedings of states.)
2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives
from justice and service.)
3. [Admission of states — Rules and regula-

Section
tions respecting the territory
and property of the United
States.)
4. (Guaranty of republican form of government
and against invasion.)

Section 1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial
proceedings of states.]
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Sec. 2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives from justice and service.]
[1.] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
[2.] A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of
the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
[3.] No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regula14
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CHAPTER 31
UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SUPPORT ACT
Section
77-31-1.
77-31-2.
77-31-3.
77-31-4.
77-31-5.
77-31-6.
77-31-7.
77-31-8.
77-31-9.
77-31-10.
77-31-11.
77-31-12.
77-31-13.
77-31-14.
77-31-15.
77-31-16.
77-31-17.
77-31-18.
77-31-19.
77-31-20.
77-31-21.
77-31-22.

77-31-1.

Purposes.
Definitions.
Remedies additional to those now
existing.
Extent of duties of support.
Interstate rendition.
Conditions of interstate rendition.
Choice of law.
Remedies of state or political subdivision furnishing support.
How duties of support enforced.
Jurisdiction.
Contents of petition for support.
County attorney to represent petitioner.
Petition for a minor.
Duty of court of this state as initiating state.
Costs and fees.
Jurisdiction by arrest.
State information agency.
Duty of court and county attorney
of this state as responding state.
Further duties of court and county
attorney of this state as the responding state.
Procedure.
Petitioner absent from responding
state — Continuance.
Evidence of husband and wife.

Section
77-31-23.
77-31-24.
77-31-25.
77-31-26.
77-31-27.
77-31-28.
77-31-29.
77-31-30.
77-31-31.
77-31-32.
77-31-33.
77-31-34.
77-31-35.
77-31-36.
77-31-37.
77-31-38.
77-31-39.

Rules of evidence.
Order of support.
Court of this state as responding
state to transmit copies to initiating state.
Additional powers of court of this
state as responding state.
Additional duties of court of this
state as responding state.
Duty of department acting as initiating state to receive and disburse payments.
Proceedings not to be stayed.
Application of payments.
Effect of participation in proceeding.
Foreign support orders — Additional remedies.
Registration of foreign support orders.
Registry of foreign support orders
maintained by clerk.
Petition for registration of foreign
support order.
Jurisdiction and procedure.
Effect of registration — Enforcement procedure.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Citation — Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act.

Purposes.

The purposes of this act are to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation
and enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect
thereto.
History: C. 1963, 77-31-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this
act" literally means Laws 1980, ch. 15, which
enacted this title. As the phrase is used

throughout this chapter, however, and in light
of § 77-31-39„ it probably means "this chapter."
Cross-References. — Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Title 78, Chapter 45.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v. Mitchell:
Indigent Paternity Defendants' Right to Counsel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion and
Nonsupport § 117 et seq.
C.J.S. — 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 73
to 89.

A.LJI. — Determination of paternity of child
as within scope of proceeding under Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 81
A.L.R.3d 1175.
Key Numbers. — Parent and Child «=» 3 to
3.4.
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77-31-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any
foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law
or procedure is in effect.
(2) "Initiating state" means any state in which a proceeding pursuant to
this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced.
(3) "Responding state" means any state in which any proceeding pursuant to the proceeding in the initiating state is or may be commenced.
(4) "Court" means the district court of this state and when the context
requires, means the court of any other state as defined in a substantially
similar reciprocal law.
(5) "Law" includes both common and statutory law.
(6) "Duty of support" includes any duty of support imposed or imposable
by law, or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or
final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation,
separate maintenance or otherwise.
(7) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(8) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed and
a state or political subdivision thereof.
(9) "Governor" includes any person performing the functions of governor or the executive authority of any territory covered by the provisions of
this act.
(10) "Support order" means any judgment, decree or order of support,
whether temporary or final, whether subject to modification, revocation or
remission regardless of the kind of action in which it is entered.
(11) "Rendering state" means any state in which a support order is
originally entered.
(12) "Registering court" means any district court of this state in which
the support order of the rendering state is registered.
(13) "Register" means to file in the registry of foreign support orders.
(14) "Certification" shall be in accordance with the laws of the certifying
state.
(15) "Department" means the Department of Human Services.
(16) "Title IV-D Agency" means the single and separate agency designated to enforce child support under an approved state plan pursuant to
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and authorized to reimburse costs and
pay incentive under that title.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 66, § 1; 1990, ch.
183, 5 51.
Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the Social
Secunty Act, cited in Subsection (16), is codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Cross-References. — Assignment of support to Department of Human Services, § 62A9-121.
Department of Human Services, § 62A-1102

77-31-3. Remedies additional to those now existing.
The remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for
any other remedies.
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History: C. 1953, 77-31-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-4. Extent of duties of support.
Duties of support arising under the law of this state when applicable under
Section 77-31-7 bind the obligor, present in this state, regardless of the
presence or residence of the obligee.
Hiatory: C. 1953, 77-31-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

7*7-31-5. Interstate rendition.
The governor of this state (1) may demand from the governor of any other
state the surrender of any person found in such other state who is charged in
this state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in
this state and (2) may surrender on demand by the governor of any other state
any person found in this state who is charged in such other state with the
crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in such other state. The
provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith shall apply to
any such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not
in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and
although he had not fled therefrom. Neither the demand, the oath nor any
proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need state or show that the
perpon whose surrender is demanded hasfledfromjustice, or at the time of the
'commission of the crime was in the demanding or other state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. — Extradition, § 7730-1 et seq.

77-31-6. Conditions of interstate rendition.
(1) Before making the demand on the governor of any other state for the
surrender of a person charged in this state with the crime of failing to provide
for the support of any person, the governor of this state may require a county
attorney or district attorney to satisfy him that at least sixty days prior thereto
the obligee brought an action for the support under this act, or that the
bringing of an action would be of no avail.
(2) When under this or a substantially similar act, a demand is made upon
the governor of this state by the governor of another state for the surrender of
a person charged in the other state with the crime of failing to provide support,
the governor may call upon any county attorney or district attorney to
investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to report to him whether
any action for support has been brought under this act or would be effective.
(3) If an action for the support would be effective and no action has been
brought, the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time to
permit prosecution of an action for support.
(4) If an action for support has been brought and the person demanded has
prevailed in that action, the governor may decline to honor the demand.
(5) If an action for support has been brought and pursuant thereto the
person demanded is subject to a support order, the governor may decline to
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honor the demand so long as the person demanded is complying with the
support order.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1993, ch. 38, § 103.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "a

county attorney or district attorney" for "any
county attorney of this state" in Subsection (1)
and inserted "or district attorney" near the
middle of Subsection (2).

77-31-7. Choice of law.
Duties of support applicable under this act are those imposed or imposable
under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for
which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the
responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise
shown.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Law of forum state applies.
It was correct for tnal court to determine the
existence and extent of Utah resident's duty of
support under the laws of Utah, rather than

Texas, where the divorce decree was entered.
Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 R2d 200 (Utah
1976).

77-31-8. Remedies of state or political subdivision furnishing support.
Whenever the state or a political subdivision thereof furnishes support to an
obligee, or whenever an individual not receiving support from the state or a
political subdivision makes an application for child support collection or
paternity determination services and pays an application fee, the state or
political subdivision has the same right to invoke the provisions hereof as the
obligee for the purposes of securing reimbursement of support expenditures,
collecting child support, and establishing paternity.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Charlesworth v. California, 793 P.2d
411 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

77-31-9. How duties of support enforced.
All duties of support, including arrearages, and arrearages reimbursable to
the state or a political subdivision thereof are enforceable by action irrespective of the relationship between the obligor and the obligee. Actions authorized
under this act include establishment of paternity, wage assignments, garnishment, liens, execution of liens, contempt proceedings and any other collection
or enforcement procedure.
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History: C. 1953, 77-31-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Child support.
—Visitation rights.
The district court erred in its order conditioning child support upon the affording of visitation rights, because it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to enter an order regarding any
matters other than the support obligation.
Charlesworth v. California, 793 P.2d 411 (Utah
£ t ^pp. 1990)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Paternity proceedings: nght to jury
trial, 51 A.L.R.4th 565.

77-31-10. Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of all proceedings hereunder is vested in the district court.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-10, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross*References. — Distnct courts, Title

78, Chapter 3; Chapter 6, Rules of Judicial
Administration.

77-31-11. Contents of petition for support.
The petition shall be verified and shall state the name and, so far as known
to the petitioner, the address and circumstances of the respondent and his
dependants for whom support is sought, and all other pertinent information.
The petitioner may include in, or attach to, the petition any information which
may help in locating or identifying the respondent, such as a photograph of the
respondent, a description of any distinguishing marks of his person, other
names and aliases by which he has been or is known, the name of his employer,
his fingerprints, or social security number.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-11, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-12. County attorney to represent petitioner.
The county attorney, upon the request of the court or the director of the
Department of Human Services or his appointed representative, shall represent the petitioner in the initiation of any proceedings under this act.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1990, ch. 183, § 52.

77-31-13. Petition for a minor.
A petition on behalf of a minor obligee may be brought by a person having
legal custody of the minor without appointment as guardian ad litem.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-33 enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, 9 2.
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77-31-17

77-31-14. Duty of court of this state as initiating state.
If the court of this state, acting as an initiating state, finds that the petition
sets forth facts from which it may be determined that the respondent owes a
duty of support and that a court of the responding state may obtain jurisdiction
of the defendant or his property, it shall so certify and may cause three copies
of (1) the petition (2) its certificate and (3) this act to be transmitted to the
court and Title IV-D Agency in the responding state. If the name and address
of such court is unknown or if the IV-D agencies in the initiating state and
responding state have so agreed, it shall cause such copies to be transmitted to
the Title IV-D Agency of the responding state, with a request that it forward
them to the proper court, and that the court of the responding state acknowledge their receipt to the court of the initiating state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-14, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. — "Title IV-D Agency"
defined, § 77-31-2.

77-31-15. Costs and fees.
There shall be no filing fee or other costs taxable to the obligee, but a court
of this state acting either as an initiating or responding state may in its
discretion direct that any part of or all fees and costs incurred in this state,
including without limitation by enumeration, fees for filing, service of process,
seizure of property, and stenographic service of both petitioner and respondent
6r either, be paid by the obligor.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-15, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-16. Jurisdiction by arrest.
When the court of this state, acting either as an initiating or responding
state, has reason to believe that the respondent may flee the jurisdiction it may
(1) as an initiating state request in its certificate that the court of the
responding state obtain the body of the defendant by appropriate process if
that be permissible under the law of the responding state; or (2) as a
responding state, obtain the body of the respondent by appropriate process.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-16, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-17. State information agency.
The department is hereby designated as the state information agency under
this act, and it shall:
(1) Compile a list of the courts and their addresses in this state having
jurisdiction under this act and transmit the same to the state information
agency of every other state which has adopted this or a substantially
similar act; and
(2) Maintain a register of such lists received from other states and
transmit copies thereof as soon as possible after receipt to every court in
this state having jurisdiction under this act.
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History: C. 1953, 77-31-17, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-18. Duty of court and county attorney of this state
as responding state.
(1) After the court of this state acting as a responding state has received
from the court of the initiating state the aforesaid copies, the clerk of the court
shall docket the case and notify the county attorney of his action.
(2) It shall be the duty of the county attorney diligently to prosecute the
case. He shall take all action necessary in accordance with the laws of this
state to give the court jurisdiction of the respondent or his property and shall
request the court to set a time and place for a hearing.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-18, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-19. Further duties of court and county attorney of
this state as the responding state.
(1) The county attorney shall, on his own initiative, use all means at his
disposal to trace the respondent or his property and if, due to inaccuracies of
the petition or otherwise, the court cannot obtain jurisdiction, the county
attorney shall inform the court of what he has done and request the court to
continue the case pending receipt of more accurate information or an amended
petition from the court in the initiating state.
(2) If the respondent or his property is not found in the county and the
county attorney discovers by any means that the respondent or his property
may be found in another county of this state or in another state, he shall so
inform the court and thereupon the clerk of the court shall forward the
documents received from the court in the initiating state to a court in the other
county or to a court in the other state or to the information agency or other
proper official of the other state with a request that it forward the documents
to the proper court. Thereupon both the court of the other county and any court
of this state receiving the documents and the county attorney have the same
powers and duties under this act as if the documents had been originally
addressed to them. When the clerk of a court of this state retransmits
documents to another court, he shall notify forthwith the court from which the
documents came.
(3) If the county attorney has no information as to the whereabouts of the
obligor or his property, he shall so inform the initiating court.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-19, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-20. Procedure.
The court shall conduct proceedings under this act in the manner prescribed
by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of duty of support claimed.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-20, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-31-25

77-31-21. Petitioner absent from responding state — Continuance.
If the petitioner is absent from the responding state and the respondent
presents evidence which constitutes a defense, the court shall continue the
case for further hearing and the submission of evidence by both parties.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-21, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-22. Evidence of husband and wife.
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications between husband and wife are inapplicable to proceedings under this act.
Husband and wife are competent witnesses and may be compelled to testify to
any relevant matter, including marriage and parentage.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-22, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-23. Rules of evidence.
In any hearing under this law, the court shall be bound by the same rules of
evidence that bind the district court.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-23, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-24. Order of support.
If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support, it may order the
respondent to furnish support or reimbursement therefor and subject the
property of the respondent to such order. The court and county attorney of any
county where the obligor is present or has property have the same powers and
duties to enforce the order as have those of the county where it was first issued.
If enforcement is impossible or cannot be completed in the county where the
order was issued, the county attorney shall transmit a certified copy of the
order to the county attorney of any county where it appears that procedures to
enforce payment of the amount due would be effective. The county attorney to
whom the certified copy of the order is forwarded shall proceed with enforcement and report the results of the proceedings to the court first issuing the
order.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-24, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-25. Court of this state as responding state to transmit copies to initiating state.
The court of this state when acting as a responding state shall cause to be
transmitted to the court of the initiating state a copy of all orders of support or
for reimbursement therefor.
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History: C. 1963, 77-31-25, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-26. Additional powers of court of this state as responding state.
In addition to the foregoing powers, the court of this state when acting as the
responding state has the power to subject the respondent to such terms and
conditions as the court may deem proper to assure compliance with its order
and in particular:
(1) To require the respondent to furnish recognizance in the form of a
cash deposit or bond of such character and in such amount as the court
may deem proper to assure payment of any amount required to be paid by
the respondent.
(2) To require the respondent to make payments at specified intervals to
the clerk of the court and to report personally to such clerk at such times
as may be deemed necessary.
(3) To punish the respondent who shall violate any order of the court to
the same extent as is provided by law for contempt of the court in any
other suit or proceeding cognizable by the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-26, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-31-27. Additional duties of court of this state as responding state.
The courts of this state, when acting as a responding state, shall have the
following duties which may be carried out through the clerk of the court:
(1) Upon the receipt of a payment made by the respondent pursuant to
any order of the court or otherwise, to transmit the same forthwith to the
department if the obligee is receiving child support enforcement services
under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act or otherwise to the court of the
initiating state; and
(2) Upon request, to furnish to the department or the court of the
initiating state a certified statement of all payments made by the respondent.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-27, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the Social

Security Act, cited in Subsection (1), is codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

77-31-28* Duty of department acting as initiating state to
receive and disburse payments*
The department, when acting as an initiating state, shall have the duty to
receive and disburse forthwith all payments made by the respondent or
transmitted by the court or the Title IV-D agency of the responding state, if the
obligee is receiving child support enforcement services under Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act. If not, the court shall assume this duty which may be
carried out through the clerk of the court.
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History: C. 1953, 77-31-28, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the Social

77-31-29.

77-31-31

Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et
seq.

Proceedings not to be stayed.

No proceeding under this act shall be stayed because of the existence of a
pending action for divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution or custody
proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-29, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Divorce decree.
Divorced wife living in California was not
required to seek modification of Utah divorce
decree that did not include provision for payment of alimony or support before initiating
proceedings to compel support; this section ereates an exception to general rule that second

case involving same parties and subject matter
as a prior case will be stayed; thus trial court
should have determined alimony and support
issue upon forwarding of petition by California
court. Maskil v. Green, 25 Utah 2d 187, 479
p.2d 343 (1971).

77-31-30. Application of payments.
No order of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a
responding state shall supersede any other order of support but the amounts
for a particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be credited against
amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under both.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-30, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Conflicting support orders.
Utah court's order that defendant pay $200
per month child support was neither modified,
vacated, reformed, nor eliminated by subse-

77-31-31.

quent order of Washington court that defendant pay $160 per month; and he owed difference upon his return to Utah. Oglesby v.
Oglesby, 29 Utah 2d 419, 510 P.2d 1106 (1973).

Effect of participation in proceeding.

Participation in any proceedings under this act shall not confer upon any
court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-31, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Visitation rights.
The district court erred in its order conditioning child support upon the affording of visitation rights, because it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to enter an order regarding any
matters other than the support obligation,
Charlesworth v. California, 793 P.2d 411 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
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77-31-32. Foreign support orders —Additional remedies.
If the duty of support is based on a foreign support order, the obligee has the
additional remedies provided in Sections 77-31-33 through 77-31-37.
History: C 1953, 77-31-32, enacted by L.
1980 chu 15, 5 2; 1995, ch. 20, ft 149.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sections 77-31-33 through 77-31-37" for "the following sections" at the end of the section.

77-31-33. Registration of foreign support orders.
The obligee may register the foreign support order in a court of this state in
the manner, with the effect and for the purposes herein provided.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-33, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2.

77-31-34. Registry of foreign support orders maintained
by clerk.
The clerk of the court shall maintain a registry of foreign support orders in
which he shall record foreign support orders.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-34, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2.
#

^^

77-31-35. Petition for registration of foreign support order.
The petition for registration shall be verified and shall set forth the amount
remaining unpaid and a list of any other states in which the support order is
registered and shall have attached to it a certified copy of the support order
with all modifications thereof. The foreign support order is registered upon the
filing of the petition subject only to subsequent order of confirmation.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-35, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2.

77-31-36. Jurisdiction and procedure.
The procedure to obtain jurisdiction of the person or property of the obligor
shall be as provided in civil cases. The obligor may assert any defense available
to a defendant in an action on a foreign judgment. If the obligor defaults, the
court shall enter an order confirming the registered support order and
determining the amounts remaining unpaid. If the obligor appears and a
hearing is held, the court shall adjudicate the issues including the amounts
remaining unpaid.
History: C. 1953, 77-31-36, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2.
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78-12-1
Section
78-12-44.
78-12-45.
78-12-46.

Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay. ~
Action barred in another state
barred here.
"Action" includes special proceeding.

Section
78-12-47.
78-12-48.

Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice
actions.
Statute of limitations — Asbestos damages.

78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-1; 1987, ch. 19, § 1.
Cross-References. — Affirmative defense,
statute of limitations as, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P.
Antitrust Act actions, § 76-10-925.
Cities and towns, claims and actions against,
§§ 11-14-21. 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 78-12-29,
78-12-30.
Collection agency bond, actions on, § 12-1-3.
Common carriers, claims and actions for loss
or damage to freight, § 54-3-16.
Contracts for sale of goods, § 70A-2-725.
Counties, claims and actions against,
§§ 17-15-10, 17-15-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-15,
78-12-30.
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et
seq.

Improvement district proceedings, § 17A-3330.
Insurance
contracts,
actions
on,
§ 31A-21-313.
Marketable record titles, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Municipal bond proceedings, § 11-14-21.
Pleading statute of limitations, Rule 9(h),
U.R.C.P.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.
Protest of solicitation or award of public contract, § 63-56-55.
Public works programs, contesting ordinances and bonds, § 55-3-16.
Securities Act, §§ 61-1-4, 61-1-22.
State,
actions
against,
§§ 63-30-12,
63-30-15.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ity, civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable
to administrative disciplinary proceedings.
Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Discovery.
The discovery rule has no application when
an action easily could have been filed between
the date of discovery and the end of the limitation period. Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen
Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987).
Escheat proceedings.
—Applicable foreign law.
Five-year limitation period within which
heirs must claim, estate to ureveat ita escheat
after death of intestate without apparent heirs
is subject to provisions of treaty between
United States and country of alien intestate,
requiring actual notice to consular authorities
of intestate's death without apparent heirs. In
re Apostolopouios' Estate, 68 Utah 344, 250 P.
469, 253 P. 1117, 48 A.L.R. 1322 (1926).

ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
—Administrative discipline.
Discovery.
Escheat proceedings.
—Applicable foreign law.
Nature and extent of right.
—Legal.
—Renewal of barred action.
—Vested.
Trust estate.
Waiver.
—Failure to plead.
When statute begins to run.
—Commencement of another action.
—Existence of cause of action.
—Particular proceedings.
—Relation back.
Amendment to complaint.
—Remediability of claim.
—Service of summons.
Applicability of section.
—Administrative discipline.
In the absence of specific legislative author-

Nature and extent of right.
—Legal.
The statute of limitations governs legal title,
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-20; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 156.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted ''Sections 78-12-18 and 78-12-19* for 'The two preceding sections" at the beginning of the section;

108

subdivided the existing single sentence into two
sentences by deleting "but all" following "accrues" and adding "All" before "such"; and substituted "Section 78-12-21" for "the next preceding section" at the end of the section.

ARTICLE 2
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
78-12-22. Within eight years.
Within eight years an action:
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of
any state or territory within the United States.
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide
support or maintenance for dependent children.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26; 1992,
ch. 30, § 177.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, made stylistic
changes.

78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real property — Instrument in writing — Distribution of
criminal proceeds to victim.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
court erred in concluding that the buyers claim
fell within the six-year period of this section.
McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

ANALYSIS

Breach of contract.
Running of statute.
—Reformation of agreements.
Breach of contract.
When a contract for the sale of land provided
no remedy in the event of the seller's default or
refusal to perform, the buyer's right to recover
money paid was not founded upon a written
instrument, but rather upon an implied right to
recover; therefore, the four-year statute of limitations in § 78-12-25(1) applied, and the trial

Running of statute.
—Reformation of agreements.
Claim for reformation of 1975 agreements
was barred by Subsection (2) of this section,
requiring actions based on a written contract to
be brought within six years. United Park City
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 R2d
880 (Utah 1993).

78-12-25. Within four years.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Breach of fiduciary duty.
Discovery rule.
Equitable actions.
Federal civil rights actions.
Land contract.
Negligent employment.
Personal injuries.
Product liability.
Relation back of complaints.

Tax paid under protest.
Tolling.
—Class actions.
Cited.
Breach of fiduciary duty.
Claim against parties for inducing, aiding,
and abetting mining corporations in breaching
their fiduciary duty was dismissed since the
acts complained of occurred more than four
years prior to the instigation of the lawsuit.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
his residence, and that proceedings under the
Nonresident Motorist Act are the only Utah
proceedings in which the applicable statute of

78-12-36

limitations is not tolled by absence from the
state. Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937, 945.
km. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 154 et seq.
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
100.

A.L.R. — Tolling of statute of limitations
during absence from state as affected by fact
that party claiming benefit of limitations remained subject to service during absence or
nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158.
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=»
84, 85.

78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of
jnsgority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.
& History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
8upp., 104-12-36; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16; 1987,
feh. 19, § 5.
^Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6
jirovides that the amendment to this section,
deleting a reference to imprisonment as a disability, applies only to causes of action that
ferise after April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application.
| Cross-References. — Actions to recover
property, effect of disability, § 78-12-21.

Age of majority, § 15-2-1.
Disaffirmance of contract by minor,
§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3.
Guardians
of
incapacitated
persons,
§ 75-5-301 et seq.
Medical malpractice actions, limitations provisions
applicable **egardles8 of disability,
iainna onniinakiA
§ 78-14-4.
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Rental illness.
(Notice of claim requirements.
j*Failure to file.
-Action barred.
Kr-Action not barred.
ity action.
^Minority.
Wrongful death.
-Minority.

against town which was barred because of failure to file claim. Hurley v. Town of Bingham,
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924).
This section does not operate to extend statutory time for filing claims against a city until
after a minor claimant has obtained majority.
Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492
P.2d 1335 (1972).
Specific requirement of timely notice to city
of claim against it takes precedence over provision tolling statute of limitations during minority of a child; failure to comply with statutory notice provisions barred action against
city hospital by parents on behalf of newborn
infant. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d
799 (Utah 1975).

Rental illness.
atifFs incest-related psychological probr were not a mental illness that would toll
statute of limitations. Whatcott v.
fcatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). ——Action not barred.
Notice of claim requirements in the Utah
Bee of claim requirements.
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-13, are
| | i i u r e to rile.
tolled by this section during the period of mi^Action barred.
nority; therefore, failure to comply with such
Pus section had no application to action notice requirements by a minor does not bar
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
agreement was made, (2) by the debtor/obligor
of the settlement agreement (or by a third
party at the debtor's direction), and (3) the payment was made to the creditor under the settlement agreement Butcher v Gilroy, 744
P.2d 311 (Utah Ct App 1987)

78-12-45

Verbal agreement.
A verbal agreement or new promise based
upon a prior agreement barred by statute
comes within this section Whitehill v Lowe,
10 Utah 419, 37 P 589 (1894) (decided under
prior law)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation
of Actions § 325 et seq
C.J.S. — 54 C J S Limitations of Actions
§ 261
AX.R. — Promises to settle or perform as
estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44
AL.R3d 482

Promises or attempts by seller to repair
goods as tolling statute of limitations for
breach of warranty, 68 A L R 3d 1277
Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions «»
146

78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here.
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or m a
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the
time it accrued.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-45.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section
—Counterclaim
Act occurring in other state
Choice of laws
—Utah court
Exception to section
—Assignee of resident's claim
^rState resident
—;-— Accrual of cause of action
Applicability of section.
vi
This section is a general provision applying
td causes of action that arise in a different
•tate and are not reduced to judgment Pan Energy v Martin, 813 P2d 1142 (Utah 1991)
Counterclaim.
r-Act occurring in other state.
Where defendant's counterclaim for malpractice occurring in Idaho was barred by the
jWaho statute of limitation, it would be barred
here under this section Lindsay v Woodward,
MJtah 2d 183, 299 P2d 619 (1956)
Pjoice of laws.
TjfJtah court.
Rla^wrongful death action by Utah resident

against Colorado residents, in which Utah
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court
applied Utah law on matter concerning the
statute of limitations, including the tolling
thereof Rhoades v Wright, 622 P 2d 343 (Utah
1980), cert denied, 454 U S 897, 102 S Ct
397, 70 L Ed 2d 212 (1981)
Exception to section.
—Assignee of resident's claim.
Resident of Utah, who acquired claim upon
which he based his right of action by virtue of
assignment after cause of action had accrued
thereon, did not come within exception to this
section Lawsonv Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P 520
(1908)
—State resident
Accrual of cause of action.
Only those persons who are Utah residents
as of the date their cause of action arises come
within the exception to this section Allen v
Greyhound Lines, 583 P 2d 613 (Utah 1978)
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78-27-15. Salaries of public officers subject to garnishment.
The state of Utah, any county, city, town, district, board of education or other
subdivision of the state, and any officer, board or institution, having in its
possession or under its control any credits or other personal property of, or
owing any debt to, the defendant in any action, whether as salary or wages, as
a public official or employee, or otherwise, shall be subject to attachment,
garnishment, and execution under such rights, remedies, and procedure as are
or may be made applicable to attachment, garnishment, and execution,
respectively, in other cases, except as provided in Section 78-27-16.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-8; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 163.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "provided in Section 78-27-16" for "in the next
section provided* at the end of the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
XT

Nonpublic employee.
Tax refund.
Nonpublic employee.
This section authorizes the State Tax Commission to comply with a writ of garnishment of
a state tax refund owing to nonpublic employees. Funk v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 818
(Utah 1992).

earnings for purposes of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act and U.R.C.R 64D(dXvii), it was
n o t g u b j e c t to ihe limitations on garnishment
contained in those ^provisions; a bank that obtained a judgment against plaintiff properly
obtained a writ of garnishment that directed
the Utah State Tax Commission to attach
plaintiff's state tax refund. Funk v. State Tax
Comm'n, 839 P.2d 818 (Utah 1992).

Tax refund.
Since a state tax refund was not disposable

78-27-21. Effect of failure to file certificate — Service of
process upon nonresident.
Whenever any such nonresident doing business as provided in Section
78-27-20 shall fail tofilesuch certificate, or such manager, superintendent, or
agent designated in such certificate cannot be found within the state of Utah,
service of process upon such nonresident in any action arising out of the
conduct of his business may be made by serving any person employed by or
acting as agent for such nonresident.
History: L. 1951, ch. 20, § 3; C. 1943,
Supp.9104-27-15; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 164.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sec-

tion 78-27-20" for "the preceding section" near
the beginning of the section and made stylistic
changes,

78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen
or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim
arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
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(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had
no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity
for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, 5 3; 1983, ch.
160, 9 1; 1987, ch. 35, § 1; 1992, ch. 277,
i 247.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted "Section 16-10a-1501" for "Section 16-10-102" in the
introductory paragraph.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Nonresident defendants.
—Auto dealer.
Transaction of any business.
—Minimal contacts.
Cited.
Nonresident defendants.
—Auto dealer.
Texas auto dealer's intentional misrepresentation of mileage on a truck eventually sold in
Utah brought the dealer under Subsection (3)
of this section, but exercise of jurisdiction was
nevertheless improper because dealer's contacts with state were not sufficient to satisfy
due process requirements. Clements v. Tbmball
Ford, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 202 (D. Utah 1993).
Transaction of any business.
Negotiations within state by nonresident's
agents concerning the sale of a Utah business,
visits by the nonresident to assist in the negotiations, and an agreement in Utah that the
nonresident would purchase the business made
a sufficient showing of the nonresident's transaction of business within this state for the court

to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Radcliffe v. Akhaven, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
—Minimal contacts.
A Texas manufacturer's sending a service
representative to Utah did not establish sufficient minimum contacts for the assertion of
specific personal jurisdiction where its contacts
in Utah were wholly unrelated to the cause of
action asserted against it. Argueilo v. Industrial
Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah
1992).
A Texas manufacturer could not have reasonably anticipated being brought into court in
Utah when it sold no finger jointing machines
in Utah and it did not seek to serve the Utah
market for finger jointing machines through
either sales representatives or advertising; the
machine that was the subject of plaintiffs suit
was sold to an ultimate buyer m California and
resale of the machine m Utah was wholly
unforeseeable. Argueilo v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992).
Cited in Recovery Processes IntT, Inc. v.
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 857 F. Supp. 863 (D.
Utah 1994).

78-27-33. Statement of injured person — When inadmissible as evidence.
Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written or
oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while
this person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of injuries
sustained in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a person
whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except
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78-45-13. Interpretation and construction.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 14.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchhne following § 78-45-1.

Cross-References. — Construction of statutes, Chapter 3 of Title 68.

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-l
78-45a-2.
78-45a-3.
78-45a-4.
78-45a-5.
78-45a-6.
78«45a-6 5.
78-45a-7
78-45a-8

Obligations of the father.
Enforcement.
Limitation on recovery from the
father.
Limitations on recovery from
father's estate.
Remedies.
Time of trial.
Paternity action — Jury trial.
Authority for blood tests.
Selection of experts.

Section
78-45a-9
78-45a-10.
78-45a-ll.
78-45a-12.
78-45a-13.
78-45a-14.
78-45a-15.
78-45a-16.
78-45a-17.

Compensation of expert wi
nesses.
Effect of test results.
Judgment.
Security.
Settlement agreements.
Venue.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Short title.
Operation of act.

78-45a-L, Obligations of the father.
The father of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to
the same extent as the father of a child born within marriage, whether or not
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral
expenses for the child. For purposes of child support collection, a child born
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband if that paternity has been established.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1; 1990, ch.
245, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, substituted
"outside of marriage" for "out of wedlock" in
both sentences and "within marriage" for "in
wedlock" in the first sentence, added "For purposes of child support collection" and the clause

beginning "if* at the end in the second sentence, and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to 62A-11-332.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§ 78-45-1 et seq.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action for reimbursement.
—Collateral estoppel.
—Costs.
Action to establish paternity.
—Attorney fees.
—Statute of limitations.
Tolling.

Cause of action for support.
Custody rights.
—Acknowledgment of paternity.
Right to tnal by jury.
Action for reimbursement.
—Collateral estoppel.
Where, in a paternity action brought for reimbursement of money provided for the benefit
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of a child allegedly fathered bv defendant the
district court tound that the state was barred
from asserting its claim by the doctrine of res
judicata because of a prior default entered
against the child's mother for failure to answer
interrogatories, it was held that since the defendant's cause of action against the mother
was different from that of the state under the
Uniform Act on Paternity, the issue involved
collateral estoppel, and because none of the
tests to apply collateral estoppel had been met,
res judicata had no application to the case
State ex rei State Dept of Social Servs v
Ruscetta, 742 P2d 114 (Utah Ct App 1987)
—Costs.
The Uniform Act on Paternitv makes no provision for an award of costs against the state in
an action tor reimbursement btate e\ rei
State Dep t of Social Servs v Ruscetta 7 12
P2d 114 (Utah Ct App 1987)
Action to establish paternity.
—Attorney fees.
This act makes no provision for awarding attorney fees to the mother in an action to establish paternitv Zito v Butler, 584 P 2d 868
(Utah 1978), overruled on grounds, Borland v
Chandler, 733 P 2d 144 (Utah 1987)
—Statute of limitations.
Tolling.
Any statute limiting the time within which a
paternity action must be commenced under the
Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled for all statu-

torily qualified plaintiffs during the period of
the child's minority Szarak v Sandoval 636
P2d 1082 (Utah 1981)
Cause of action for support.
A minor child via her guardian ad litem
has standing to maintain a cause of action
against her father for support Fauver v
Hansen, 803 P 2d 1275 (Utah Ct App 1990)
Custody rights.
—Acknowledgment of paternitv.
Father who publicly acknowledged his paternity had right to custody of his illegitimate
child, second only to mother s right, so that it
was improper for ]uvenile court to dismiss petition tor custody and thereby terminate father s
parental right without hearing to determine
whether he was tit and proper person btate ex
rei Babv Girl M. 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P 2d
1013, 45 A L R 3 d 206 (1970)
Under * 78-45-4 1, a stepparent has the obligation of support to the same extent as a natural parent so long as the stepparent s marriage
to the natural parent continues State ex rei
J W F , 799 P2d 710 (Utah 1990)
Right to trial by jury.
Since there is no inherent constitutional
right to a trial by jury in paternity proceedings
in this state and the Legislature has not provided for such a right by statute, the defendant, a putative father, had no right to a trial
by jury Hyatt v Hill, 714 P 2d 299 (Utah
1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v Mitchell
Indigent Paternitv Defendants Right to Counsel, 1982 Utah L Rev 933
Comment. Husband Notification for Abortion in Utah A Patronizing Problem, 1986
Utah L Rev 609
Note, Establishing Paternitv Through HLA
Testing Utah Standards for Admissibility,
1988 Utah L Rev 717
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L
Rev 166
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in
Utah, 1989 Utah L Rev 859
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,
J WF v Schoolcraft The Husbands Rights to
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law,
1989 B Y U L Rev 955

Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am Jur 2d Bastards
* 68
C.J.S. — 10 C J S Bastards * 18
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of putative fathers promise to support or provide for
illegitimate child, 20 A L R 3d 500
Paternity proceedings right to jury trial, 51
A L.R 4th 565
Rights and obligations resulting from
human artificial insemination, 83 A L R 4th
295
Admissibility or compellability of blood test
to establish testee s nonpaternity for purpose of
challenging testee's parental rights, 87
A L R 4th 572
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=»
21
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78-45a-2. Enforcement.
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same
or other proceedings:
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158. § 2; 1990, ch.
245, § 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23. 1990, inserted "putative father" in the first sentence and made
minor stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-

sions bv Department of Human Services,
§ 62A-1-111.
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties
of Department of Human Services in collecting
child support, § 62A-11-104.
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to
62A-11-332.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to counsel.

ANALYSIS

Estoppel and laches.
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Right to counsel.
—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
Discretion of court.
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.
Estoppel and laches.
Under appropriate circumstances, laches
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v.
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).
A paternity action brought six years after
the birth of the child was not barred by laches,
where defendant made no factual showing to
support his argument that he was prejudiced
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d
144 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Where child was conceived while mother was
married to her first husband and born while
she was married to her second husband, the
child was legitimate whichever husband was
the father, and testimony by mother that disputed second husbands fatherhood and supported first husband's fatherhood would not
iUegitimize the child and was properly admissible in paternity action against first husband.
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982).

—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
While due process does not require Utah to
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be
some complicated paternity suits in which the
risks of error would be high enough that the
presumption against the right to appointed
counsel would be overcome; given the availability and quality of the blood tests, there is
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Discretion of court.
Due process of law does not require that all
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity
actions must always be appointed counsel;
whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discretion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d
1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Standard of proof.
— Preponderance of evidence.
The applicable standard of proof where paternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Stepparents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 74 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq.

A.L.R. — Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188.
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685.
Necessity or propriety of appointment of independent guardian for child who is subject of
paternity proceedings, 70 A.L.R.4th 1033.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <3=
30 et seq.

78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father.
The fathers liability for past education and necessary support are limited to
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3.
Cross-References. — Limitation of action

for support or maintenance of dependent children, § 78-12-22.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statute of limitations.
—Tolling.
While any statute limiting the time within
which a paternity action must be commenced
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled

for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of
child support is still limited by this section.
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Clark v. Jeter. Equal Protection Versus Statutes of Limitation in Paternity Actions, 15 J.
Contemp. L. 119 (1989).

Am. Jur. 2d. -- 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
35.

78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate.
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be payable for dependency under other laws.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act/' as used in this section, means Laws 1965,
ch. 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to
78-45a-17.

Cross-References. — Civil liability for support, Chapter 45 of this title.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.

Key Numbers.
35.
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78-45a-5. Remedies.
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available
for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the
state Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or
in its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to
enforce that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department, all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable
to this chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Department of Human Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the
county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that
department.
History: L. 1966, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96,
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"Human Services" for "Social Services" twice
in Subsection (2).
Meaning of "this act" — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45a-4.
'Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act — The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, referred to in the
last sentence in Subsection (1), is Chapter 31 of
Title 77.

Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 45b of this
title, referred to in Subsection (2), was repealed
by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407. For present comparable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-301 through
62A-11-328.
Cross-References. — Creation of Department of Human Services, § 62A-1-102.
General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1.
General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1.
General jurisdiction of district court,
§ 78-3-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

Interests of mother and state.
Jurisdiction.
—Minonty of putative father.
Powers of the court.
Interests of mother and state.
In an action pursuant to the Uniform Act on
Paternity, the state has a separate interest
from that of the mother. The state and the
mother are not in privity because each has separate interests and legal rights over which the
other has no control. State ex rel. State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah
Ct App. 1987).

—Minority of putative father.
District court, and not the juvenile court, has
jurisdiction over action brought under the Uniform Act on Paternity, when the putative father is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Dick, 684 P.2d 42 (Utah
1984).
Powers of the court
The Uniform Paternity Act does not endow a
district court with subject matter jurisdiction
to terminate the parent-child relationship or to
permanently relieve a parent of his or her support obligations. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d
1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
126 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards ^ 116, 117.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <s=>
69 to 71.

78-45a-6. Time of trial.
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy
of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may
be perpetuated according to the laws of this state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, $ 6.
Cross-References. — Depositions before action, Rule 27, U R.C.P
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
123.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 101.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children <s=
55.

78-45a-6.5. Paternity action — Jury trial.
(1) Either party to an
jury trial to determine
(2) (a) The procedure
is the same as for
(b) The standard

action commenced under this chapter may demand a
paternity.
and law governing a trial by jury under this chapter
a civil jury trial in district court.
of proof is "by a preponderance of the evidence."

History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 93, $ 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 93 be-

came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45a-7. Authority for blood tests.
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf
of any person whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the
action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order
the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party
refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity
against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests
of justice so require.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7.
Cross-References. — Blood tests to determine parentage, ^ 78-25-18 to 78-25-23.

Unreasonable searches, Utah Const., Art. I,
Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note. Establishing
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
* 118.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards <> 93.
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A.L.R. — Admissibility or compellability of
blood test to establish testee's nonpaternity for
purpose of challenging testee's parental rights,
87 A.L.R.4th 572.

78-45a-10

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=
45.

78-45a-8. Selection of experts.
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as examiners of blood types
who shall be appointed by the court. The experts shall be called by the court
as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests have
been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood
types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which
may be offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts
shall be determined by the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8.
Cross-References. — Blood test examiner
as witness, § 78-25-20.

Court appointment of expert witnesses. Rule
706, U.R.E.

78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses.
The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the court shall be
fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The
court may order that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such
times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but
not appointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not
be taxed as costs in the action.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 9.
Cross-References. — Judgment and costs,
Rule 54, U.R.C.P.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards $ 138.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=
75.

7S-45a-10. Effect of test results.
If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted
upon all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the
possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is
within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood
type.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of blood
test results, § 78-25-21.
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Admissibility.
- H u m a n leukocyte antigen test.
This section does not preclude the admusib.hty of human leukocvte antigen (HLA) test
results if such test otherwise meets the rele.
. , , , , ,,
.
,
vant legal standards for the admission ot scientific evidence; such test results were not admitted as evidence where the party submitting the
test results failed to establish an adequate
foundation at trial for their admissibility. Phillips ex rei. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Jackson, 615 P 2d 1228 (Utah 1980)

Expert witness.
To assist the tner-of-fact in understanding
t h e h h, t e c h n l c a l h u m a n l e u k o c v t e a n t
tegt results a n d t h e a c c o m p a n y l n g statlstlcai
bablhtles the results
a t e . t h e te
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. .
mony ot a qualified expert witness is required,
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d t
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ai in orx
der t0
y
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this witness and permit his testiy
nd the est
admit
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f ^ ? ^ * ° f S°cml f ? ™ V , W o o d s . 7 4 4 R 2 d
315 (Utah C t A
1987)
PPfolding proper foundatl0n shown)
-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing
Paternitv Through HLA Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
* 107.

78-45a-11.

C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 93
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children e=
53.

Judgment.

Judgments under this act may be for periodic payments which may vary in
amount. The court may order payments to be made to the mother or to some
person, corporation, or agency designated to administer them under the supervision of the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, * 11.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchlme following ^ 78-45a-4

Cross-References. — Income withholding,
^ 62A-11-401 to 62A-11-414

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
* 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 111.

78-45a-12.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children ®=
67.

Security.

The court may require the alleged father to give bond or other security for
the payment of the judgment.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, * 12.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
* 128.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 118 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children *»
70.
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78-45a-13. Settlement agreements.
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father is binding only when
approved by the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
98 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C J.S. Bastards § 40 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children *=
33.

78-45a-14. Venue.
An action under this act may be brought in the county where the alleged
father is present or has property or in the county where the mother resides.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45a-4.

Cross-References. — Venue, general provisions, Chapter 13 of this title,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
76.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 57, 58.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=>
37.

78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 15.
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of
w
[t]his act," as used in this section, see note
under same catchline following § 78-45a-4.
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions

adopting the Uniform Act on Paternity are
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
Cross-References. — Construction of statutes, Chapter 3 of Title 68.

78-45a-16. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Act on Paternity."
History: L. 1965, ch. 168, § 16.
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of

"[t)his act," as used in this section, see note
under same catchline following § 78-45a-4.
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78-45a-17

78-45a-17. Operation of act.
This act applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock as defined in this act
where birth occurs after this act takes effect.
History: J-. 1965, ch. 158, § 17.
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of
'[t]his act," appearing throughout this section,
see note under same catchline following
* 78-45a-4

The term "after this act takes effect" means
after the effective date of Laws 1965, ch 158,
i eM May 11, 1965

CHAPTER 45b
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
(Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2; 1987, ch. 161, * 314; 1988, ch. 1, § 407.)

78-45b-l to 78-45b-25.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals
^§ 78-45b-l to 78-45b-6. as enacted by Laws
1975, ch 96, § 1, Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 1, and
Laws 1985, ch 8, <* 2 and as amended by Laws
1987, ch. 77, § 3 and Laws 1987, ch 161,
§§ 309 to 312, relating to common law remedies, definitions, support debt and hearings, effective January 19,1988 For present comparable provisions, see H 62A-11-301 to
62A-11-308
Laws 1987, ch
161, $ 314 repeals
* 78-45b-6 1, as last amended bv Laws 1983,
ch. 161, ^ 2, concerning findings in order by
department and judicial review, effective January 1, 1988
Laws 1988, ch 1, ^ 407 repeals ^ 78-45b-7
to 78-45b-21, as enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 96,
*§ 7, 10, 12, 14 to 18, 20 and 21, Laws 1984
(S S.), ch 2, *> 1 and Laws 1985, ch 9, § 1 and
as amended by Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 8, Laws
1984, ch 14, <> 1, Laws 1984 <S S ), ch. 2, § 2,

Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch. 151,
5} 313, relating to hens, final orders, payments
and charging ail uncollectable support debts,
effective January 19, 1988 For present comparable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-309 to
62A-11-321.
Section 78-45b-22 (L. 1975, ch. 96, § 22), relating to inapplicability of statute of limitations to hens, wage assignment or garnishment, was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2
Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals ^ 78-45b-23
to 78-45b-25, as enacted by Laws 1984, ch 13,
* 5, Laws 1985, ch 13, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch
77, § 4, relating to medical and dental expenses of dependent children, providing court
debt information to consumer reporting agencies, and the information received from state
tax commissioner, effective January 19, 1988
For present comparable provisions, see
§§ 62A-11-326 to 62A-11-328.

CHAPTER 45c
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION
Section
78-45c-l
73-45c-2
78-45c-3
78-45c-4

Purposes — Construction.
Definitions
Bases of jurisdiction in this
state
Persons to be notified and
heard.

Section
78-45c-5
78-45c-6
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Service of notice outside state
— Proof of service — Submission to jurisdiction.
Proceedings pending elsewhere
— Jurisdiction not exercised
— Inquiry to other state —
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isal to provide for the support and maintenance of the wife, child or
Idren is prima facie evidence that the desertion, neglect or refusal is
Ifiil. (Laws 1915, ch. 72, § 6; C S. 1920, § 5036; R S 1931, § 32-808; C S.
5, § 9-808; W.S. 1957, § 20-76; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. WS 1957,
0-3-104.)
ross references. — As to husband and
as witnesses in civil and criminal cases
rally, see 5§ 1-12-101 through 1-12-104
epealing c l a u s e s . — Laws 1915, ch 72,
repealed all laws and parts of laws in
lict therewith

Law reviews. — For note, "Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases," see 19 Wyo L.J. 35
(1964)
For discussion of husband wife testimonial
privilege and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
see XII Land 6 Water L Rev 601 (1977)

10-3-105.
epealed by Laws 1986, ch 67, § 2.
-fc-ence.. - A. „ e n f o r e e m e n t o f
I support orders, see $ 20-6-201 et seq
litor's notes. — This section, which deI from Laws 1981, ch 168. 5 1, related to
enforcement of child support orders For
>rovisions of this section as last amended,
the 1985 cumulative supplement

^

^

^

^ ^

_

^

^

ch 67, i 3 provides "Nothing in this act shall
be construed as invalidating any execution
against income ordered pursuant to W S
20-3-105 prior to the effective date of this act "

RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT

CHAPTER 4
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Sec
20-4 101 Purpose
20-4-102 Definitions
20-4-103 Remedies cumulative
20-4 104 Duties of support binding regardless
of residency
20 4 105 Reciprocal surrender of person failing to support
20-4-106 Prerequisites to demand for surrender of obligor
20-4-107 Duties of support, presumption
20 4 108 Action for reimbursement by state
furnishing support
20-4-109 Proceeding for enforcement, limitation on defense
20-4-110 Jurisdiction of proceeding for enforcement
20-4-111 Complaint, contents, filing
20-4 112 Representation of obligee
20-4-113 Representation of obligee, minor
20-4-114 Complaint forwarded to responding
state
20-4 115 Payment of fees and costs
20-4-116 Obligor may be detained, conditions
20-4-117 Child support enforcement section
designated state information section, duties
20-4-118 Case docketed in responding state,
duty of prosecuting attorney
20-4-119 Duty to locate obligor; forward complaint to another court
20-4-120 Continuance of hearing, taking of
depositions, conditions
20-4-121 Obligor may be compelled to testify,
immunity from criminal prosecution, exception
20-4 122 Privilege of husband and wife inapplicable

Sec
20-4-123 Proceedings governed by rules of
evidence, modification of support
orders
20 4-124 Property of obligor subject to order
for support, order may be for
warded to another county for enforcement
20-4-125 Copy of support order forwarded to
initiating state
20-4-126 Court may impose conditions to
assure compliance
20-4-127 Paternity in question, adjudication
20 4 128 Duties of responding court
20 4-129 Receipt and disbursement of payments by initiating court
20 4-130 Responding court not to stay proceeding or refuse hearing, order of
support pendente lite
20-4 131 Support order not superseded by
order of another court
20-4-132 Enforcement of support within Wyoming
20-4-133 Attorney general may appeal or
cause an appeal in public interest
20-4-134 Registration of foreign support or
ders, prosecuting attorney to as
sist obligee
20-4 135 Registration of foreign support orders, supporting documents required for registration, notice to
obligor
20-4-136 Foreign support order subject to
same defenses and proceedings as
order from this Btate
20 4 137 Interpretation
20-4-138 Short title

C r o s s references. — As to petition by wife
for support, see § 20 2-102 As to desertion of
wife or children, see chapter 3 of this title As
to wage earner's exemption from garnishment,
see 5 1-17-411
L a w r e v i e w s . — For article, "The Uniform
Enforcement of Support Act in Wyoming," see
8 Wyo L J 237
Am. J u r . 2d, ALR and C.J S. references.
— 23 Am Jur 2d Desertion and Nonsupport
55 117 to 149
Construction and application of state statutes providing for reciprocal enforcement of
duty to support dependents, 42 ALR2d 768

Obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident parent in filiation or support proceeding, 76
ALR3d 708
Determination of paternity of child as within
scope of proceeding under Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, 81 ALR3d 1175
Wife's liability for necessaries furnished husband, 11 ALR4th 1160
Authority of court, upon entering default
judgment, to make orders for child custody or
support which were not specifically requested
in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 ALR5th 863
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§ 20-4-101. Purpose.
The purposes of this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] are to improve and
extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support. (Laws
1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-106; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-105; Laws 1977,
ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-101.)
Quoted in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213
(Wyo. 1985).

§ 20-4-102. Definitions.
(a)

As used in this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138]:
(i) "Court" means the district court of this state and when the context
requires means the court of any other state as defined in a substantially
similar reciprocal law;
(ii) "Duty of support" means a duty of support imposed or imposable
by law, order, decree or judgment of any court, whether interlocutory or
final or whether incidental to an action for divorce, separation, separate
maintenance or otherwise, and includes the duty to pay arrearages of
support past due and unpaid;
(iii) "Governor" means any person performing the functions of governor or the executive authority of any state covered by this act;
(iv) "Initiating state" means a state in which a proceeding pursuant to
this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced. "Initiating
court'' means the court in which a proceeding is commenced;
(v) "Law" means both common and statutory law;
(vi) "Obligee" means a person, state or political subdivision to whom a
duty of support is owed, or that has commenced a proceeding for
enforcement of an alleged duty of support or for registration of a support
order. It is immaterial if the person to whom a duty of support is owed is a
recipient of public assistance;
(vii) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support or against
whom a proceeding for the enforcement of a duty of support or
registration of a support order is commenced;
(viii) "Prosecuting attorney" means the public official in the appropriate place who has the duty to enforce criminal laws relating to the failure
to provide for the support of any person;
(ix) "Register" means to file in the registry of foreign support orders;
(x) "Registering court" means any court of this state in which a
support order of a rendering state is registered;
(xi) "Rendering state" means a state in which the court has issued a
support order for which registration is sought or granted in the court of
another state;
(xii) "Responding state" means a state in which any responsive
proceeding pursuant to the proceeding in the initiating state is com58
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menced. "Responding court" means the court in which the responsive
proceeding is commenced;
(xiii) "State" includes a state, territory or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal
law is in effect;
(xiv) "Support order" means any judgment, decree or order of support
in favor of an obligee whether temporary or final or subject to modification, revocation or remission, regardless of the kind of action or
proceeding in which it is entered. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957,
§ 20-107; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-106; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S.
1957, § 20-4-102.)
Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b)
in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-4-103. Remedies cumulative.
The remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for
any other remedies. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-108; Rev. W.S.
1957, § 20-107; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-103.)
Right to enforce support orders not abrogated. — Adoption of this chapter did not
abrogate a plaintiffs right to petition for
enforcement or the district court's authority to

enforce its support orders by using its contempt
power. Graham v. Fen no, 734 P.2d 983 (Wyo.
1987).

§ 20-4-104. Duties of support binding regardless of residency.
Duties of support arising under the law of this state, when applicable under
W.S. 20-4-107, bind the obligor present in this state regardless of the presence
or residence of the obligee. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-109; Rev.
W.S. 1957, § 20-108; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-104.)

§ 20-4-105. Reciprocal surrender of person failing to support.
(a) The governor of this state may:
(i) Demand of the governor of another state the surrender of a person
found in that state who is charged criminally in this state with failing to
provide for the support of any person; or
(ii) Surrender on demand by the governor of another state a person
found in this state who is charged criminally in that state with failing to
provide for the support of any person.
(b) Provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent with this act
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] apply to the demand even if the person whose
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time of the
59

§ 20-4-106

WYOMING STATUTES 1977

§ 20-4-107

commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom. The demand, oath and
any proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need not state or show
that the person whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice or at the
time of the commission of the crime was in the demanding state. (Laws 1973,
ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-110; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-109; Laws 1977, ch.
152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-105.)
I^aw reviews. — "Wyoming Extradition,"
11 Wyo. L J . 61.

§ 20-4-106. Prerequisites to demand for surrender of obligor.
(a) Before making demand upon the governor of another state for
surrender of a person charged criminally in this state with failing to provide
for the support of a person, the governor of this state may require any
prosecuting attorney of this state to show that at least sixty (60) days prior
thereto the obligee initiated proceedings for support under this act
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] or that any proceeding would be of no avail.
(b) If, under a substantially similar act, the governor of another state
makes a demand upon the governor of this state for surrender of a person
charged criminally in that state with failure to provide for the support of a
person, the governor may require any prosecuting attorney to investigate the
demand and report to him whether proceedings for support have been
initiated or would be effective. If it appears to the governor that a proceeding
would be effective but has not been initiated he may delay honoring the
demand for a reasonable time to permit the initiation of a proceeding.
(c) If proceedings have been initiated and the person demanded has
prevailed therein, the governor may decline to honor the demand. If the
obligee prevailed and the person demanded is subject to a support order, the
governor may decline to honor the demand if the person demanded is
complying with the support order. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957,
§ 20-111; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-110; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957,
$ 20-4-106.)

§ 20-4-107. Duties of support; presumption.
Duties of support are those imposed under the laws of any state where the
obligor was present for the period during Which support is sought. The obligor
is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for
which support is sought until otherwise shown. In determining when a duty of
support terminates, the age of majority shall be the age of majority of the
rendering state. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-112; Rev. W.S.
1957, § 20-111; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-107; Laws
1987, ch. 87, § 1.)
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Cross references. — As to criminal prosecution for nonsupport of wife or children, see
ft 20-3-101.

§ 20-4-108. Action for reimbursement by state furnishing
sfUpport.
If a state or political subdivision furnishes support to an individual obligee,
it has the same right to initiate a proceeding under this act [§§ 20-4-101
through 20-4-138] as the individual obligee for the purpose of securing
reimbursement for support furnished and of obtaining continuing support.
(Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-113; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-112; Laws
1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-108.)

§ 20-4-109. Proceeding for enforcement; limitation o n defense.
All duties of support are enforceable by a proceeding under this act
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] including a proceeding for civil contempt. The
defense that the parties are immune to suit because of their relationship as
husband and wife or parent and child is not available to the obligor. (Laws
1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-114; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-113; Laws 1977,
ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-109.)

§ 20-4-110. Jurisdiction of proceeding for enforcement.
Jurisdiction of any proceeding under this act [§§ 20-4-101 through
20-4-138] is vested in the district court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957,
§ 20-115; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-114; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957,
§ 20-4-110.)

§ 20-4-111. Complaint; contents; filing.
(a) The complaint shall be verified and shall state the name, and, so far as
known to the obligee, the address and circumstances of the obligor and the
persons for whom support is sought, and all other pertinent information. The
obligee may include in or attach to the complaint any information which may
help in locating or identifying the obligor.
(b) The complaint may be filed in the appropriate court of any state in
which the obligee resides. The court shall not decline or refuse to accept and
forward the complaint on the ground that it should be filed with some other
court of this or any other state where there is pending another action for
divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus, adoption or
custody between the same parties or where another court has already issued a
support order in some other proceeding and has retained jurisdiction for its
enforcement. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-116; Rev. W.S. 1957,
§ 20-115; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-111.)
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\ 20-4-112. Representation of obligee.
If this state is acting as an initiating state the prosecuting attorney upon
he request of the court, the state department of family services, a county
ommissioner, an overseer of the poor or other public assistance director shall
epresent the obligee, in any proceeding under this act [§§ 20-4-101 through
KM-138]. If the prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses to represent the
bligee, the attorney general may order him to comply with the request of the
ourt or may undertake the representation. (Laws 1973, ch. 165, § 1; W.S.
957, S 20-117; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-116; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S.
957, S 20-4-112; Laws 1991, ch. 161, * 3.)

20-4-113. Representation of obligee; minor.
A complaint on behalf of a minor obligee may be executed and filed by a
erson having legal custody of the minor without appointment as guardian ad
item. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-118; Rev. W.S. 1957,
20-117; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-113.)
Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references,
- Liability of guardian ad litem for infant

party to civil suit for negligence in connection
with suit, 14 ALR5th 929.

20-4-114. Complaint forwarded to responding state.
If the initiating court finds that the complaint sets forth facta from which it
lay be determined that the obligor owes a duty of support and that a court of
lie responding state may obtain jurisdiction of the obligor or his property, it
ball so certify and cause three (3) copies of the complaint and its certificate
nd one (1) copy of this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] to be sent to the
ssponding court. Certification shall be in accordance with the requirements
f the initiating state. If the name and address of the responding court is
nknown and the responding state has an information agency comparable to
lat established in the initiating state it shall cause the copies to be sent to
le state information agency or other proper official of the responding state
ith a request that the agency or official forward them to the proper court and
lat the court of the responding state acknowledge their receipt to the
litiating court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20119; Rev. W.S.
957, § 20-118; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-114.)

20-4-115. Payment of fees and costs.
An initiating court shall not require payment of either a filing fee or other
ists from the obligee but may request the responding court to collect fees and
«ts from the obligor. A responding court shall not require payment of a
ling fee or other costs from the obligee but it may direct that all fees and
>sts requested by the initiating court and incurred in this state when acting
i a responding state, including fees for filing of pleadings, service of process,
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seizure of property, stenographic or duplication service or other service
supplied to the obligor be paid in whole or in part by the obligor or by the
county. These costs or fees do not have priority over amounts due to the
obligee. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-120; Rev. W.S. 1957,
§ 20-119; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-115.)

§ 20-4-116. Obligor may be detained; conditions.
(a)

If the court of this state believes that the obligor may flee it may:
(i) AH an initiuting court, request in its certificate that the responding
court obtain the body of the obligor by appropriate process; or
(ii) As a responding court, obtain the body of the obligor by appropriate process, and may release him upon his own recognizance or upon his
giving a bond in an amount set by the court to assure his appearance at
the hearing. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-121; Rev. W.S.
1957, § 20-120; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-116.)

Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b)
in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-4-117. Child support enforcement section designated
state information section; duties.
(a) The child support enforcement section within the department of family
services is designated as the state information agency under this act
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138]. It shall:
(i) Compile a list of the courts and their addresses in this state having
jurisdiction under this act and transmit it to the state information agency
of every other state which has adopted this or a substantially similar act.
Upon the adjournment of each session of the legislature the agency shall
distribute copies of any amendments to the act and a statement of their
effective date to all other state information agencies;
(ii) Maintain a register of lists of courts received from other states and
transmit copies thereof promptly to every court in this state having
jurisdiction under this act; and
(iii) Forward to the court in this state which has jurisdiction over the
obligor or his property petitions, certificates and copies of the act it
receives from courts or information agencies of other states.
(b) If the state information agency does not know the location of the
obligor or his property in the state and no state location service is available, it
shall use all means at its disposal to obtain this information, including the
examination of official records in the state and other sources.
(c) After the deposit of three (3) copies of the complaint and certificate and
one (1) copy of the act of the initiating state with the clerk of the appropriate
court, if the state information agency knows or believes that the prosecuting
attorney is not prosecuting the case diligently it shall inform the attorney
general who may undertake the representation. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1;
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3 1957, § 20-122; Rev W S 1957, § 20-121, Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev
3 1957, § 20-4-117; Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 2; 1991, ch 161, § 3 )

§ 20-4-120. Continuance of hearing; taking of depositions;
conditions.

50-4-118. Case docketed in responding state; duty of
prosecuting attorney.

If the obligee is not present at the hearing and the obligor denies owing the
duty of support alleged in the petition or offers evidence constituting a
defense, the court, tipon request of either party, may continue the hearing to
permit evidence relative to the duty to be adduced by either party by
deposition or by appearing in person before the court The court may
designate the judge of the initiating court as a person before whom a
deposition may be taken (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1, W S 1957, § 20-125; Rev.
W S 1957, § 20-124; Laws 1977, ch 152, § 1; Rev. W S 1957, § 20-4-120.)

0 After the responding court receives copies of the complaint, certificate
act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] from the initiating court the clerk of
court shall docket the case and notify the prosecuting attorney of his
on.
>) The prosecuting attorney shall prosecute the case diligently He shall
s all action necessary in accordance with the laws of this state to enable
court to obtain jurisdiction over the obligor or his property and shall
lest the court to set a time and place for a hearing and give notice thereof
he obligor in accordance with law.
) If the prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses to represent the obligee,
attorney general may order him to comply with the request of the court or
' undertake the representation (Laws 1973, ch 155, § 1; W S 1957,
1-123; Rev. W S. 1957, § 20-122; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1, Rev W S 1957,
M-118)

0-4-119. Duty to locate obligor; forward complaint to
another court.
) The prosecuting attorney shall use all means at his disposal to locate
ibligor or his property, and if because of inaccuracies in the complaint or
rwise the court cannot obtain jurisdiction the prosecuting attorney shall
•m the court of what he has done and request the court to continue the
pending receipt of more accurate information or an amended complaint
the initiating court.
i If the obligor or his property is not found in the county and the
scuting attorney discovers that the obligor or his property may be found
tother county of this state or in another state, he shall so inform the court,
eupon the clerk of the court shall forward the documents received from
ourt in the initiating state to a court in the other county or to a court in
tther state or to the information agency or other proper official of the
* state with a request that the documents be forwarded to the proper
All powers and duties provided by this act [§§ 20-4-101 through
138] apply to the recipient of the documents so forwarded If the clerk of a
of this state forwards documents to another court he shall forthwith
/ the initiating court.
If the prosecuting attorney has no information as to the location of the
or or his property, he shall so inform the initiating court. (Laws 1973, ch.
5 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-124; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-123; Laws 1977, ch. 152,
Rev. W.S 1957, § 20-4-119.)
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§ 20-4-121. Obligor may be compelled to testify; immunity
from criminal prosecution; exception.
If at the hearing the obligor is called for examination as an adverse party
and he declines to answer upon the ground that his testimony may tend to
incriminate him, the court may require him to answer in which event he is
immune from criminal prosecution with respect to matters revealed by his
testimony, except for perjury committed in this testimony. (Laws 1973, ch.
155, § 1; W S 1957, § 20-126, Rev W S 1957, § 20-125; Laws 1977, ch. 152,
§ 1, Rev W S 1957, § 20-4-121)

§ 20-4-122. Privilege of husband and wife inapplicable.
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications
between husband and wife are inapplicable to proceedings under this act
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138]. Husband and wife are competent witnesses
and may be compelled to testify to any relevant matter including marriage
and parentage (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1;WS 1957, § 20-127, Rev. W S 1957,
§ 20-126; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W S 1957, § 20-4*122 )
Cross references — For constitutional
provision as to self incrimination, see art 1,
( ll.Wyo Const As to privileged communications and acts generally, see 5 1 12-101

Law reviews — For discussion of husband
wife testimonial privilege and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L
Rev 601 (1977)

§ 20-4-123. Proceedings governed by rules of evidence;
modification of support orders.
In any hearing for the civil enforcement of this act [§§20-4-101 through
20-4-138] the court is governed by the rules of evidence applicable in a civil
court action in the district court. If the action is based on a support order
issued by another court, a certified copy of the order shall be received as
evidence of the duty of support, subject only to defenses available to an obligor
with respect to paternity or to a defendant in an action or a proceeding to
enforce a foreign money judgment A support order issued by another court is
not subject to retroactive modification except the order may be modified with
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§ 20-4-124

ect to any period during which a petition for modification is pending, but
from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the
jor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. In
case in which child support has been ordered to be paid to the clerk of a
ming court, any periodic payment or installment under the provisions of
decree concerning maintenance is on the date it is due a judgment by
ation of law. The determination or enforcement of a duty of support oWed
te (1) obligee is unaffected by any interference by another obligee with
£ of custody or visitation granted by a court. (Laws 1973, ch 155, § 1;
1957, § 20-128; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-127; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev.
1957, § 20-4-123; Laws 1987, ch. 87, § 1; 1988, ch. 26, § 1.)
»iied in Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d
TVyo. 1985).

>-4-124. Property of obligor subject to order for support; order may be forwarded to another
county for enforcement.
If the responding court finds a duty of support, it may order the obligor
nish support or reimbursement therefor and subject the property of the
>r to the order. Support orders shall require that payments be made to
erk of the court of the responding state. Each support order under this
ti shall provide for a statement of the obligor's address and social
ty number if known, the name and address of the obligor's employer and
imes and birthdates of each child to whom the order relates. The court
>rder the obligor to notify the clerk of court in writing within fifteen (15)
f any change of address or employment. In any proceeding to enforce the
any required notice or pleading shall be served as provided by the
ing Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon entry of any support order the court
tlso enter an income withholding order as provided by W.S. 20-6-204.
The court and prosecuting attorney of any county in which the obligor
ent or has property have the same powers and duties to enforce the
s have those of the county in which it was first issued. If enforcement is
ible or cannot be completed in the county in which the order was
the prosecuting attorney shall send a certified copy of the order to the
iting attorney of any county in which it appears that proceedings to
the order would be effective. The prosecuting attorney to whom the
d copy of the order is forwarded shall proceed with enforcement and
he results of the proceedings to the court first issuing the order. (Laws
i. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-129; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-128; Laws 1977,
§ 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-124; Laws 1987, ch. 87, § 1; 1989, ch. 182,
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§ 20-4-125

RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT

§ 20-4-127

Cross references. — As to process, and
service and filing of pleadings and other papers, see Rules 4 and 5, W.R.C.P.

§ 20-4-125. Copy of support order forwarded to initiating
state.
The responding court shall cause a copy of all support orders to be sent to
the initiating court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-130; Rev. W.S.
1957, S 20-129; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-125.)

§ 20-4-126. Court may impose conditions to assure compliance.
(a) In addition to the foregoing powers a responding court may subject the
obligor to any terms and conditions proper to assure compliance with its
orders and in particular to:
(i) Require the obligor to furnish a cash deposit or a bond of a
character and amount to assure payment of any amount due;
(ii) Require the obligor to report personally and to make payments at
specified intervals to the clerk of the court; and
(iii) Punish under the power of contempt the obligor who violates any
order of the court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-131; Rev.
W.S. 1957, § 20-130; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957,
§ 20-4-126.)
Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b)
in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-4-127. Paternity in question; adjudication.
If the obligor asserts as a defense that he is not the father of the child for
whom support is sought and it appears to the court that the defense is not
frivolous, and if both of the parties are present at the hearing or the proof
required in the case indicates that the presence of either or both of the parties
is not necessary, the court shall adjudicate the paternity issue pursuant to
W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. Otherwise the court shall continue the
hearing until the paternity issue has been adjudicated. (Laws 1973, ch. 155,
§ 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-132; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-131; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1;
Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-127; Laws 1987, ch. 87, § 1.)
Father cannot challenge paternity previously established. — Defendant's claim that
he was entitled to challenge his paternity of a
child, previously established under Utah law,
by blood testing in accordance with 5 14-2-109
(genetic tests), was foreclosed by the full faith
and credit clause of the United States constitu-

tion, the doctrine of res judicata, and Wyoming
precedent. Livingston v. Vanderiet, 861 P.2d
549 (Wyo. 1993).
Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references.
— Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
ALR4th 565.
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10-4-128. Duties of responding court
) A responding court has the following duties which may be carried out
ugh the clerk of the court:
(i) To transmit to the initiating court any payment made by the
obligor pursuant to any order of the court or otherwise; and
(ii) To furnish to the initiating court upon request a certified
statement of all payments made by the obligor. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1;
W.S. 1957, § 20-133; Rev. W.S. 1957, 9 20-132; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1;
Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-128.)
iter's notes. — There is no subsection (b)
i section as it appears in the printed acts.

)-4-129. Receipt and disbursement of payments by initiating court.
initiating court shall receive and disburse forthwith all payments made
e obligor or sent by the responding court. This duty may be carried out
igh the clerk of the court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-134;
W.S. 1957, § 20-133; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957,
4-129.)

-4-130. Responding court not to stay proceeding or
refuse hearing; order of support pendente lite.
ssponding court shall not stay the proceeding or refuse a hearing under
ct [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] because of any pending or prior action
ceeding for divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus,
on or custody in this or any other state. The court shall hold a hearing
ay issue a support order pendente lite. In aid thereof it may require the
r to give a bond for the prompt prosecution of the pending proceeding. If
her action or proceeding is concluded before the hearing in the instant
ding and the judgment therein provides for the support demanded in
mplaint being heard, the court shall conform its support order to the
it allowed in the other action or proceeding. Thereafter the court shall
ay enforcement of its support order because of the retention of
ction for enforcement purposes by the court in the other action or
ling. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-135; Rev. W.S. 1957,
14; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-130.)
liction to modify registered foreign
order and payment of arrearages,
te this section, a state court had
on, under i 20-4-136(a), to modify a
i foreign support order. Also, since
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there was no final money judgment, the court
had jurisdiction to modify payment of the
arrearages. Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213
(Wyo. 1985).

§ 20-4-131

RECIPROCAL EJNFUKCUMttm u r a u r r u r i i

s ^u-t-ioo

§ 20-4-131. Support order not superseded by order of
another court,
A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this act
(§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] does not nullify and is not nullified by a
support order made fc? a court of this state pursuant to any other law or by a
support order made by a court of any other state pursuant to a substantially
similar act or any other law, regardless of priority of issuance, unless
otherwise specifically provided by the court. Amounts paid for a particular
period pursuant to any support order made by the court of another state shall
be credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under
any support order made by the court of this state. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1;
W.S. 1957, § 20-136; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-135; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev.
W.S. 1957, § 20-4-131.)
Applied in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213
(Wyo. 1985).
Quoted in Poirrier v. Jones, 781 P.2d 531
(Wyo 1989)

Am. Jur. 2d, ALU and C.J.S. references.
— Construction and effect of provision of
iprocal
^^mt n a t nRoe c8U
Enforcement of Support
™*
PP°rt order shall supersede or
nullify any other order, 31 ALR4th 347.

§ 20-4-132. Enforcement of support within Wyoming.
(a) The method of enforcement of duties of support provided in this act
(§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] is applicable as nearly as possible if both the
obligee and obligor are in Wyoming but in different counties.
(b) If the appropriate court of the county in which the petition for support
is filed finds that the obligor owes a duty of support and that a court of
another county may obtain jurisdiction over the obligor or his property, the
clerk of court shall send the petition and a certificate of findings to the court of
the county in which the obligor or his property is found. An initiating or
responding court and the clerk of court have the duties and powers provided in
this act in enforcing this section. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957,
§ 20-137; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-136; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1, Rev. W.S. 1957,
§ 20-4-132.)

§ 20-4-133. Attorney general may appeal or cause an appeal in public interest.
(a) If the attorney general is of the opinion that a support order is
erroneous and presents a question of law warranting an appeal in the public
interest, he may:
(i) Perfect an appeal to the proper appellate court if the support order
was issued by a court of this state; or
(ii) If the support order was issued in another state, cause the appeal
to be taken in the other state. In either case expenses of appeal may be
paid on his order from funds appropriated for his office. (Laws 1973, ch.
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155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-138; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-137; Laws 1977, ch.
152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-133.)
Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b)
this section as it appears in the printed acts.

enforce the order. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-140; Rev. W.S.
1957, § 20-139; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-135.)
SUted in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213
(Wyo. 1985)

20>4-134. Registration of foreign support orders; prosecuting attorney to assist obligee.

§ 20-4-136. Foreign support order subject to same defenses
and proceedings as order from this state.

(a) If the duty of support is based on a foreign support order, the obligee
ay register the foreign support order in a court of this state in the manner,
ith the effect and for the purposes herein provided.
(b) The clerk of the court shall maintain a registry of foreign support
ders in which he shall file foreign support orders.
(c) If this state is acting either as a rendering or a registering state the
osecuting attorney upon the request of the court, a state department of
ilfare or other local welfare official shall represent the obligee in proceed£8 under this part [chapter]. If the prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses
represent the obligee, the attorney general may order him to comply with
i request of the court or may undertake the representation. (Laws 1973, ch.
5, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-139; Rev. W.S. 1957, 5 20-138; Laws 1977, ch. 152,
I; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-134.)

(a) Upon registration, the registered foreign support order shall be treated
in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this state. It has
the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and
proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a support order of this state
and may be enforced and satisfied in like manner. No support order issued by
a court of another state shall be modified in a proceeding under this act if the
court which entered the support order had jurisdiction over the parties at the
time the order was issued and the child or either of the parties resides in that
state. After proper notice and an opportunity to present evidence, other
registered support orders may be prospectively modified in accordance with

tated in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213
o. 1985).

20-4-135. Registration of foreign support orders; supporting documents required for registration; notice
to obligor.
0 An obligee seeking to register a foreign support order in a court of this
e shall transmit to the clerk of the court three (3) certified copies of the
IT with all modifications thereof, one (1) copy of the reciprocal enforcement
upport act of the state in which the order was made, and a statement
fled and signed by the obligee showing the post office address of the
gee, the last known place of residence and post office address of the
sjor, the amount of support remaining unpaid, a description and the
tion of any property of the obligor available upon execution and a list of
states in which the order is registered. Upon receipt of these documents
clerk of the court, without payment of a filing fee or other cost to the
fee, shall file them in the registry of foreign support orders. The filing
titutes registration under this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138].
> Promptly upon registration the clerk of the court shall send by certified
egistered mail to the obligor at the address given a notice of the
tration with a copy of the registered support order and the post office
sss of the obligee. He shall also docket the case and notify the prosecuting
ney of his action. The prosecuting attorney shall proceed diligently to
70

W.S. 20-6-306.
Cb) The obligor has twenty (20) days after the mailing of notice of the
registration in which to petition the court to vacate the registration or for
other relief. If he does not so petition the registered support order is
confirmed.
(c) At the hearing to enforce the registered support order the obligor may
present only matters that would be available to him as defenses in an action
to enforce a foreign money judgment. If the obligor shows to the court that an
appeal from the order is pending or will be taken or that a stay of execution
has been granted the court shall stay enforcement of the order until the
appeal is concluded, the time for appeal has expired, or the order is vacated,
upon satisfactory proof that the obligor has furnished security for payment of
the support ordered as required by the rendering state. If the, obligor shows to
the court any ground upon which enforcement of a support order of this state
may be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the order for an
appropriate period if the obligor furnishes the same security for payment of
the support ordered that is required for a support order of this state. (Laws
1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-141; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-140; Laws 1977,
ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-136; Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 1.)
The 1993 amendment added the last two
sentences in subsection (a).
Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 2, makes the act
effective immediately upon completion of all
acta necessary for a bill to become law as
provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved
March 5, 1993.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act," which appears in the next-to-last sentence in subsection (a), means Laws 1993, ch.

184, §§ 1 and 2, which appears as various
sections throughout title 20. See the Table of
Disposition of Acts in volume 1.
Jurisdiction to modify registered foreign
support order despite § 20-4-130.— Despite
( 20-4-130 (no stay of proceedings), a state
court had jurisdiction, under subsection (a), to
modify a registered foreign support order. Also,
since there was no final money judgment the
court had jurisdiction to modify payment of the
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20-4-138

arrearages. Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213
(Wyo. 1986) (decided prior to the 1993 amend

party determines that modification of a registered foreign support order is proper, notice

ment).
Obligee m u s t b e given notice a n d o p p o r
ttinjty t o b e h e a r d . — Where t h e responding
court on its own initiative or upon motion of m

and an opportunity to present evidence must
be given to the obligee. Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710
P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1985) (decided prior to t h e 1993
amendment),

§ 20-4137. Interpretation.
This act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138) shall be so construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it. (Laws 1973, ch, 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-142, Rev W.S. 1957,
§ 20-141; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-137.)
% j o t e d in Bjugan v. Bjugan. 710 R 2 d 213
(Wyo. 1985).

CHAPTER

r »MM
ni
Custody
Sec.
20-6-101.
20-5-102.
20-5-103.
20 5-104.

Short t i # e
Purposed
Definitions.
Jurisdiction to make
.
determination.
Notice before decree.
Notice for exercise of jurisdiction
over person outside this state;
time; service; exception.
Exercise of jurisdiction by court in
this state; proceedings in other
states.
Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction.
Wrongful or improper removal of a
child from another state
Custody proceeding; required infermation.
Person having custody to be joined
as a party.
Court may order party to proceeding
to appear.
Custody decree binding on all parties.

Sec
20 5 114 Recognition and enforcement of initial or modification decree m a d e
by court of a n o t h e r s t a t e .
20-5-116. Modifying custody decree m a d e by
court of another s t a t e .
20-5-116. Effect of custody decree m a d e by
court of another s t a t e .
20 5-117 Clerk of district court to m a i n t a i n
registry; contents.
20 5 118. Forwarding copy of decree,
20 5-119. Testimony of witnesses; method of
obtaining.
20 5-120. Requesting court of a n o t h e r s t a t e to
adduce evidence; order p a r t y to
appear.
20-5-121 Request from courts of a n o t h e r s t a t e .
10-5-122, Preserving records of custody proceeding.
20-5-123. Custody proceeding; record from another state.
20-5-124. Policies applicable to i n t e r n a t i o n a l
area.
20-5-125. Priority of custody proceeding raia
ing queation of jurisdiction.

C r o s s r e f e r e n c e s . — As to temporary custody of child during pendency of court action,
see § 20-2-112. As to disposition and provision
for children in decree, see § 20-2-113.
Law r e v i e w s . — For article, "Mediation and
Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases — Practical Considerations, Ethical Concerns and Proposed Standards of Practice," see XXVII Land
& Water L. Rev. 435 (1992).
A m . J u r . 2d, A L R a n d C.J.S. r e f e r e n c e s .
— Admissibility of social worker's expert testimony on child custody issues, 1 ALR4th 837,
Initial award or denial of child custody to
homosexual or lesbian parent, 6 ALR4th 1297,
Propriety of awarding joint custody of children, 17 ALR4th 1013.
Interference by custodian of child with noncustodial parent's visitation rights as ground
for change of custody, 28 ALR4th 9.
Attorneys' fee awards in parent-nonparent
child custody cases, 45 ALR4th 212.
Parent's transsexuality a s factor in award of

custody of children, visitation r i g h t s or t e r m i nation of parental rights, 59 A L R 4 t h 1170
Tort liability of public a u t h o r i t y for failure
to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parents' custody, 60 A L R 4 t h 942.
State court's authority, in m a r i t a l or child
custody proceeding, to allocate federal income
tax dependency exemption for child to noncustodial parent under § 152(e) of t h e I n t e r n a l
Revenue Code (26 USC § 152(e)), 77 ALR4th
786.
Applicability of Uniform Child Custody J u risdiction Act (UCCJA) to t e m p o r a r y custody
orders, 81 ALR4th 1101.
Child custody; when does s t a t e t h a t issued
previous custody determination h a v e continuing jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or P a r e n t a l Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U S C § 1738A,
83 ALR4th 742.
Child custody and visitation r i g h t s of person
infected with AIDS, 86 ALR4th 2 1 1 .
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20^6-106.
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§ 20-4-138. Short title.

20 5-108,

This act f§§ 20-4-101 through 20 4-138] may be cited as the Revised
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1;
W.S. 1957, f 20-143; Rev, W.S. 1957, § 20-142; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev.
W.S. 1957, § 20-4-138.)
S e v e r a b i l i t y . — Laws 1973, ch. 166, f 2 ,
provide*: "If a n y provision of this act o r the
application thereof to a n y person or ctrcumitance is held invalid, t h e invalidity does not
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
*

STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services, ex rel.
Laramie County, Wyoming, ex rel.
Terry McNinch,
*
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

*

Case No. 934000065

*

vs.
TERRY WESTMORELAND,

*

Defendant.
*

THIS MATTER WAS TRIED TO THE COURT on June 8, 1994. At the
conclusion of the trial, the Court announced to counsel that the
Court was satisfied that Defendant is the biological father of Cody
Ray Holland, born April 1, 1977.

There was an overwhelming

abundance of evidence to this effect.
During the trial, Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss based
upon various Wyoming statutes. The Court desired both counsel to
research and brief these statutory issues and therefore, allowed
the parties time in which to submit memoranda of points and
authorities concerning the issues of law.

The Court has now

reviewed the Defendant's Memorandum, the Plaintiff's responsive
Memorandum and the Defendant's rebuttal Memorandum.

/SfcP/1 4 i».

STATE OF UTAH v. TERRY WESTMORELAND
#934-65
Page 2
POINT 1
Utah law applies to this case. Under the uniform reciprocal
enforcement of support act adopted by both the State of Utah and
State of Wyoming, the statutes of the State of Utah, as the
responding state, apply. Additionally, the Plaintiff/mother was a
resident of the State of Utah at the time of conception and the
conception occurred in the State of Utah. Therefore, under U.C.A.
78-12-45, even if Wyoming law applied, the Plaintiff would have the
right to pursue this action.
Defendant relies on Wyoming statute 14-2-102 et. seq. in
making the argument that inasmuch as Ernie Holland acknowledged the
paternity of Cody, Ernie Holland is the presumed father.

This

Court specifically finds there is no presumption that Ernie Holland
is the father of Cody Holland.

The Decree of Divorce, entered

February 6, 1981, by the 254th Judicial District Court in Dallas
County, Texas, between Ernie B. Holland and Cody's mother, the
Plaintiff, Terry McNinch, specifically decrees that "no children
now under the age of 18 were born to the marriage and none are
expected".

This Decree was entered within five (5) years of the

birth of Cody Holland and satisfies the requirements of Wyoming
statute 14-2-104.

STATE OF UTAH v. TERRY WESTMORELAND
#934-65
Page 3
Therefore, while concluding that Utah law governs in this
case, this Court also concludes that whether Utah or Wyoming
statutes are applied, the Plaintiff has the right to pursue this
action.

POINT 2
The doctrines of laches and estoppel are unsupported by the
facts of this case.

In order to invoke the equitable remedies of

laches or estoppel, the Defendant must himself have "clean hands".
The evidence in this case is abundant that Defendant, upon learning
of Plaintiff's pregnancy, became upset, refused responsibility for
the child, threatened to leave, and prior to the birth, actually
did leave and did not return.

The Plaintiff continually tried to

locate Defendant on her own and through Defendant's relatives. She
was able to make contact with Defendant in 1981 and 1982 and
Defendant actually met the child. Defendant repeatedly refused to
provide Plaintiff an address or other information concerning him.
Plaintiff was again able to make contact with Defendant in 1992 and
she and the minor child visited with Defendant in the State of
Utah.

Photographs submitted in evidence show Defendant and the

minor child posing together and reveal a strong resemblance in the
physical characteristics of the two individuals.

Defendant
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c o n t i n u e d t o make h i m s e l f

unavailable

to Plaintiff

or the

c h i l d and c o n t i n u e d t o r e f u s e a n y i n f o r m a t i o n a s t o h i s
or

minor

residence

employment.
W h i l e D e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h e d e f e n s e of e s t o p p e l , t h e

evidence

d o e s n o t s u p p o r t a n y of t h e t h r e e r e q u i r e d e l e m e n t s f o r s u c h a
defense.

Additionally,

t h e d e f e n s e of l a c h e s i s

inapplicable

because i t a p p e a r s t o the Court t h e major reason f o r t h e d e l a y
p r o s e c u t i n g t h i s p r o c e e d i n g was D e f e n d a n t ' s

in

actions.

CONCLUSION
The C o u r t r u l e s t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t
Cody Ray H o l l a n d ,

born April

entitTed to the relief

1977, and t h a t

as sought in t h e

Counsel for P l a i n t i f f
Conclusions,

1,

is the natural father

I

is directed to prepare

d a y of S e p t e m b e r ,

is

Complaint.

a n d a Judgment i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s

DATED t h i s

Plaintiff

of

1994.

BY THE COURT:

iLA

•JL

JUDGE BEN H. HADF
FIRST DISTRICT COlffcT

Findings,

Decision.
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(Alaska 1985) (stepfather, who lacks legal custody but
acts as child's de facto guardian, has standing to file a
URESA action against child's natural father); Suddetli
\\ Scou. 394 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1984) (grandmother, with
whom dependent resided with knowledge and consent
of dependents divorced parents, has standing to sue
the dependent's mother for support under URESA). A
few states, in enacting section 13. have eliminated the
restriction to legal custody. They allow any person with
custody (physical or legal) to file a URESA petition on
behalf of a minor without appointment of a guardian ad
litem. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 13:1667 (West 1983):
N.C. Gen. Stat. S 52A-I0.2 (1984). It would appear that
in these states, the fact that the petitioner has physical
custody of the child in violation of a court decree is not
a valid ground for dismissal by the responding court of
a URESA petition.
RURESA further provides that an obligee includes
a state or political subdivision to whom a duty of support is owed because of public assistance provided to
the obligor's dependents. Sections 2(f), (8) of RURESA.

the demand if the obligor is complying with the support
order.
Obviously, the emphasis of section 6 is that criminal
extradition should be a last resort" remedy. Where
civil enforcement is oi limited value, however, the
attorney should know how to effectively invoke URESA's extradition provisions.

V.

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT

A support duty can be civilly enforced under URESA
through two procedures: the filing of a regular URESA
petition and registration of a "foreign" support order.
What follows is a chronological step-by-step explanation oi the regular petition process; registration of an
existing support order is discussed in Section VI. For
the most part, discussion will be based on the 1968
Revised pniiorm Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act. Where other versions are signiticantlv different,
those differences will be noted.
A. Standing To File

B. Representation in the Initiating State

A URESA action may be initiated by any obligee.
An obligee is defined by section 2(f) o( RURESA as a
person to whom a duty of support is owed. The definition is broad enough to include a spouse or ex-spouse
seeking support/ Many responding states, however
are reluctant .to initially establish a spousal support
order through URESA. See Section V. C of this chapter. Also, some states refuse to hear "alimony only"
URESA cases because such cases do not qualify for
IV-D services and therefore do not result in federal
incentive payments. Unfortunately, in states taking that
approach, a spouse's only option may be to hire a
private attorney to file an action in the second state—
an option beyond the financial resources of many obligees. An obligee may also be a person who has commenced a URESA proceeding for enforcement of an
aliened duly of support. Section 2(0 of RURESA. The
definition therefore includes an unwed mother or a
spouse seeking the initial establishment of a support
order.
If the obligee is a minor, the person having legal
custody o( the minor may file a petition on the minor's
behalf without appointment as guardian ad litem. Section 13 of RURESA. Some states that have enacted
section 13 of RURESA have given an expansive reading to legal custody as an element of standing, allowing
a child's de facto caretaker to tile the action. Since the
primary issue in a URESA proceeding is the duty of
support, these courts hold that if parents fail to provide
for their children, they are obligated to reimburse those
who do. See. <'.-.. Saask v. YandelL 702 P.2d 1327

The 1950 version o( URESA lacks any provision
concerning representation of the obligee in the initiating
state. Such a provision first appears in 1952 and is
retained in each amended URESA version. Section 11
in 1952 version. Section 12 in 1958 and 1968 versions.
The provision specifies that upon request of the court
or local welfare official, the prosecuting attorney in the
initiating state is responsible for representing the obligee. Section 12 of RURESA further provides that if the
prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses to represent
the obligee, the Attornev General may order the prosecutor to fulfill his or her duty or may undertake representation himself or herself. This statement was added
in response to reports of unenthusiastic representation
by prosecuting attorneys.
In enacting the representation provision of URESA,
many states have identified legal offices—other than
the prosecutor's office—as having responsibility for
representing URESA petitioners. In nearly all states,
however, representation is provided by some type of
government attorney. A few states, such as Connecticut, contract with private attorneys to represent URESA
petitioners.
Nothing in U RES A precludes a private attorney from
assisting a client in filing a URESA action. In fact, some
states have expressly provided that option in their
URESA provisions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1655.5 (West
1982); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 576-25 (1985); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 518C.07 (West Supp. 1989). Private attorney
representation is consistent with the intent of the Act's
Aft
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
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AFFIDAVIT OF GENETIC
TESTING EXPERT

ss»
GUILFORD COUNTY

)

Deborah L. Cutter. P h D
1»

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7*

8.

9.

10.

being first duly sworn, states as follows:

I am an Associate Director of the Parentage Evaluation Laboratory at Genetic Design, Inc., and a custodian of Ita
records of genetic testing performed in this case, as such, em 9 proper person to make this affidavit* f have
personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this affidavit.
Genetic Design is certified by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 1$ accredited by the American
Association of Blood Banks.
Genetic Oesign received and tested blood samples from the following individuals:
Mother:
TERRY MCNINCH
Child:
CODY HOLLAND end,
ANeged Father: TERRY WESTMORELAND.
Genetic Oesign received the alleged father's blood sample on November 2 3 , 1 9 9 3 . The sample was delivered to
Genetic Design's laboratory by Overnight Courier.
Genetic Design received the blood samples of the mother and child(ren) on August 17, 1 9 9 3 . The samples were
delivered to Genetic Design's laboratory by Overnight Courier,
A t the time of receipt all blood samples were examined, found to be intact, logged in r assigned a unique
identification number, end taken to work stations on the premises for testing. The samples were at all times
segregated from ell other samples.
Genetic paternity testing w a s performed on the blood samples from the individuals in this case. The genetic tests
performed and the procedures followed were in compliance with the Standards for Parentage Testing Laboratories
published by the American Association of Blood Banks (the "Standards11). The results and conclusions are Indicated
on the attached report.
All tests were performed in compliance with the Standards and were analyzed Independently by t w o or more
laboratory technologists under my supervision and control. The test results were initially reviewed by the laboratory
staff end again by myself to verify the accuracy of the report.
The testing conducted is accepted by the scientific, medical and legal communities es reliable in resolving cases of
disputed parentage. Calculations for testing were performed using published gene frequency tables and a completely
documented computer program.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and if sworn as a witness, I can testify
competently thereto.
DATED this

day of

^aV ,

199J-

Deborah L. Cutter* Ph.D, Associate Director
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

*A

day of %Ls>J .

199jL~

p ^ ERNITY EVALUATION REPU^

GREENSBORO. NC 27409-9664

By
Mother
Child
Alleged Father
Case Number:
Location;

TERRY MCNINCH
CODY HOLLAND
TERRY WESTMORELAND
22292269R1
8ALT LAKE CITY, UT

Caucasian
Reference No.:
Account,

Blood Drawn
August 16,1993
August 16,1093
November 22,1993
0027460601/91962431
AB100F

SYSTEM

MOTHER

CHILD

ALLEGED FATHER

ABO
fth
MN8S
Kelt
Duffy
Wdd

B
DCce
MNs
k

B
DCcEft
MSa
K,k

0
DCcEe
M8
K,k

«+

a+

a-

ft-

*+
•+

1.24
3.22
4.21
11.30
1.10
0.87

PGM1
AGP

1+
B

1+
B

1+
B.C

1.57
085

HLA-A

A1
A3
88
814

A3
A29
B14
B62

A2B
A»
B62
B27

310.92

HLA-B

Race
Caucasian

PROBABILITY OF PATERNITY 39 99%

Office

PATEfiNrTY
INDEX

COMBINED PATERNITY INDt-X S9047 to 1

The alleged father, TERRY WESTMORELAND, cannot be excluded aa the biological father of CODY HOLLAND. Based on the
above genetic testing results, the probability of paternity la 99.99% aa compared to an untested random man of the North American
Caucasian population. (Prior Probability * .5)

I, the underagned Director, upon being duly sworn on oath, do depose and state that I 'cad the foregoingreporton the analysis of genetic specimens from
the above-named Individuals, signed by myself, and that thetactsand results therein are true and oorraot
Swqm
Sworn to and "Su^g^eJiJbefore me this
>:dayof J U S f e ^ . t 192<
atGreeriri&to, NoMhCa&iii&.

for{kb«l
NotaryPublio,/St&tfpf tibittJcaiollna

r

• R.Scott Foster, PhD,, Director
D BertaHamby Muggins, Ph.D., Director
• Robert A, Bever,PHJX, Director
n Lawrence A. Chaver, Ph .DM Director
££DeborahL Cutter, Ph.D.. Aeeodate Director
D ChartesM.Kelly^hl
D RuthP Koester, Ph.| 3 * PLAINTIFFS

MBIT
^-^ur\**J«

fnj* ia

arihari hv tha Partmtaae Testina Committee, American Association of Blood

BILL LONG
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURTS
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE

J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

OF

ERNIE DWAYNE HOLLAND

)

254th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AND

TERRY ME HOLt AND

J

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

DECREE OF DIVORCE
On

the

6th

day

of

February

i lQ$if

ERNIE DWAYNE HOLLAND

appeared

in

person

Petitioner
and by

attorney and announced ready for trial.
Respondent waived issuance and service of citation by waiver duly filed and
did not otherwise appear.
The Court, having examined the pleadings and heard the evidence and
argument of counsel» finds that all necessary residence qualifications and prerequisites of law have been legally satisfied, that this Court has jurisdiction of aii the
parties and subject: matter ot this cause, and that the material

allegations

contained in Petitioner's pleadings are true. A jury was waived, and all matters in
controversy, including questions of fact and of law, were submitted to the Court.
All persons entitled to citation were properly cited,
IT

15 DECREED

Petitioner t

and

that

ERNIE DV/AYNE HOLlAW

TERRY RAE HOLLAND

Respondent, be and they are hereby divorced,
IT )S DECREED triat the personal property of the parties be and is hereby
awarded to the party having possession of such property on the date ol this decree.
The parties retirement plans and disability benefits* 11 any, and other benefits
which arise irom tneir employment or military service are awarded as their sole
and separate property to that party from whose employment or military service
these benefits arise.
The Court finds that no children, now under the age of IS years, were born to
the marriage and none are expected,
AU c o s t s of court expended in this cause are adjudged against the party by
whom incurred, for which let execution issue.
IT IS DECREED that all relief requested in this cause and not expressly
granted herein be and is hereby denied.
SIGNED this

6th

day of

February

-f

19C1.

JUDGE PRESIDING

If

•»?••"

I

